07-03-03 SR-2025-04 ENMilitaymobility05012025

Source: ECA.

Pillar I – Multimodal corridors and logistical hubs: investing in dualuse transport infrastructure

3

2

-

5

Pillar II – Regulatory support measures

1

5

-

6

Pillar III – Resilience and preparedness

-

9

5

14

Pillar IV – Partnership dimension

-

4

-

4

Total

4

20

5

29

39

Table 4 – Invitations for member states to act – ECA progress assessment summary for the seven member states visited Total

Source: ECA.

Pillar I – Multimodal corridors and logistical hubs: investing in dualuse transport infrastructure

5

-

-

5

Pillar II – Regulatory support measures

2

-

1

3

Pillar III – Resilience and preparedness

-

-

1

1

Pillar IV – Partnership dimension

-

-

-

-

Total

7

0

2

9

40

Conclusions and recommendations 78 EU policy on military mobility has developed since the first steps were taken in 2017. This audit examined the progress made, specifically looking at the second EU action plan on military mobility (Action Plan 2.0), published in November 2022. The plan was developed taking into account stakeholder contributions but under time pressure in the challenging context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Overall, we conclude that Action Plan 2.0 was not built on sufficiently solid foundations, due to some design weaknesses, such as a lack of both an in-depth ex ante analysis and a needs assessment allowing the evaluation of a commensurate budget. Progress towards its objectives – ensuring swift and seamless movement of military personnel, materiel and assets, including at short notice and on a large scale within and beyond the EU – has so far been variable.

79 We found that there is no central function or body in the EU that coordinates

military mobility measures. Representatives from five member states we visited referred to the governance arrangements for military mobility in the EU and indicated that they were complex and that it was difficult to find out who did what. In the area of regulatory measures, we identified overlaps (for example, simultaneous reporting lines and, similar project scopes) between what the different stakeholders do in relation to military mobility in the EU. The European Parliament has partial oversight of military mobility in the EU (see paragraphs 22-31).

Recommendation 1 – Improve the governance arrangements for military mobility in the EU The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should: (a) streamline coordination between the EU, member states and other stakeholders, for instance by appointing a single point of contact as appropriate; (b) enhance existing synergies and interaction between the European Defence Agency, Permanent Structured Cooperation projects and the Commission and the EEAS to minimise the risk of overlaps. Target implementation date: 2025

80 The wording of Action Plan 2.0 was the result of a compromise, which, while

ensuring common agreement, may have diluted its overall effectiveness by accommodating the diverse positions of 27 member states. The design of the Action Plan 2.0, which covers the 2022-2026 period, resulted in limitations regarding monitoring

41 and reporting. The plan states that EU-level actors, including the European Defence Agency, “will” undertake the actions addressed to them, but merely “invites” the member states to undertake the actions addressed to them. Member states have no obligation, nor were they asked by the Commission or the EEAS, to specifically report to the EU via a formalised process on the actions they are “invited” to take, and therefore do not do so (see paragraphs 33-37 and 40).

81 Three of the seven member states we visited consider Action Plan 2.0 a political

document communicating that the EU is active in the area of military mobility. It is hampered, however by not being sufficiently operational. For instance, only 13 of 29 key actions at EU level have target dates (see paragraphs 38-39).

82 The first progress report for Action Plan 2.0 was published in November 2023. It

does not systematically include information on the progress made to date on each individual key action at EU level. Therefore, rather than providing a clear reference to the progress on actions set out in the action plan, the report is more of a list of what has happened in terms of military mobility in the EU in the past year of the reporting period. It also does not include an analysis of lessons learned so far, for instance from multinational military exercises (see paragraphs 40-41 and 73).

Recommendation 2 – Monitor and report on the progress of each action included in Action Plan 2.0 The Commission and the EEAS should closely monitor the implementation of Action Plan 2.0 by systematically assessing progress, delays and potential issues in relation to each key action at EU level. Without prejudice to member states’ sovereignty in military mobility, the Commission and the EEAS should encourage the member states to provide the information on the progress of actions envisaged for them. The information on the fulfilment of each action should then be included in subsequent progress reports. Target implementation date: 2025

83 The amount of EU funding made available plays a key role in determining how much

leverage the EU can expect to have in influencing military mobility policy choices. The stakeholders we interviewed all regarded the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework’s (MFF) budget of €1.69 billion under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for military mobility dual-use infrastructure as modest, but they also generally welcomed it as a first step in the right direction. We found that, at the time Action Plan 2.0 was published, the Commission had not made a robust estimate of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable (see paragraphs 35 and 43).

42

84 To take into account developments in the security situation in Europe following the

start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Commission front-loaded the available amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls under CEF. Six of the seven member states we consulted considered this to be the right approach to take, as EU-funded projects could then potentially be completed earlier. While making this budget available quickly for investments in dual-use infrastructure sent an important political signal from the EU, we found that it led to a lack of stability and predictability in the EU funding provided, as there will be a gap of more than 4 years until the next MFF – and therefore a significant interval before any new calls and funding for dual-use infrastructure. This risks contributing to delays in potential additional important investments and a loss of experience among stakeholders in relation to EU funding and tenders (see paragraph 45).

85 Despite the level of oversubscription for the second and third calls, and the

unprecedented level of threats at the EU’s borders, which are more tangible than ever, no more EU funds are available under the current MFF for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects (see Figure 9 and paragraph 48).

86 The potential applicants for general Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) transport calls

are often the same as those for the military mobility calls. Indeed, we found that projects supported under CEF transport calls are often located on both the core trans-European transport (TEN-T) network and the military mobility network and meet dual-use requirements, as per the criteria for CEF military mobility calls. There is therefore potential to use CEF transport calls to solve military mobility bottlenecks (see paragraph 48).

Recommendation 3 – Assess the possibility of using CEF transport calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects under the current MFF (2021-2027) The Commission should assess the possibility of using the remaining CEF transport calls under the current MFF to finance dual-use infrastructure projects. This assessment should take into account military requirements and the gaps identified by the EU in its military network. Target implementation date: 2025

43

Recommendation 4 – Take steps to improve the predictability of possible funding for military mobility under the post-2027 MFF When preparing the next MFF proposal, the Commission should examine how possible funding for dual-use infrastructure can be made more predictable. The proposal should include an assessment of whether relevant EU instruments can be used to finance dualuse infrastructure projects. Target implementation date: 2027

87 We found that the five project selection criteria for the CEF military mobility calls

with equal weighting were only partially adequate to identify projects of key relevance to improving military mobility in the EU. This assessment was confirmed by four of the seven member states we visited, In particular, the military assessment only counted towards the assessment of one criterion, priority and urgency. There is therefore a risk of some of these dual-use projects not being the most relevant from a military perspective (see paragraphs 44 and 53).

88 We also identified that the selection of dual-use infrastructure projects for EU

funding lacked sufficient consideration of geopolitical aspects. Three of the six member states that expressed an opinion on the subject agreed. Projects were selected in a piecemeal way, project by project, to improve some isolated parts of a corridor but not necessarily in the most strategic locations, and without considering the broader picture. All member states visited considered that the selection process for EU-funded dual-use infrastructure projects should include certain forms of prioritisation (see paragraphs 54 and 56).

89 The 95 projects selected for EU funding were split among 21 different EU member

states. There is a clear concentration of EU-funded projects in the central and eastern part of the EU, with three of the top four member states bordering Russia, three bordering Belarus and one bordering Ukraine. On the other hand, on the southern route towards Ukraine, for instance, the EU did not fund any projects in Greece and made only a modest contribution to a Bulgarian consortium participant (see paragraphs 58-60).

44

Recommendation 5 – Improve the selection process for dual-use infrastructure projects under the post-2027 MFF Under the post-2027 MFF, the Commission and the EEAS should ensure that the most relevant dual-use infrastructure projects are selected by prioritising investments that address gaps identified by the EU in its military network, thereby promoting efficiency and effectiveness. This should include looking for synergies with NATO corridors. To this end, the Commission could consider increasing the weighting of the military assessment in the selection process to reflect the principle that dual-use projects should benefit both civilian and military users fairly. Target implementation date: 2027

90 We found that Action Plan 2.0 included far too many actions and was not sufficiently

focused. This was particularly the case for the pillar III “Resilience and preparedness”, the one with the highest number of key actions at EU level (14 out of 29 or 48 %). Several stakeholders had the same concern (see paragraph 72).

91 Overall, we found that four of the 29 key actions at EU level can be considered

completed, while the majority remained ongoing. For five out of 29 actions there was insufficient information to assess the current state of implementation. A further eight key actions were under the responsibility of EDA, which we do not have the power to audit, meaning we were unable to verify their implementation status. Overall, pillar I of Action Plan 2.0, covering investments in dual-use transport infrastructure, saw the most progress, while work on the other three pillars was largely ongoing (see paragraphs 6577).

92 The seven member states we visited responded to the invitation, under the pillar I,

to undertake dual-use transport infrastructure investments. While they have actively contributed to the work on the regulatory support measures under pillar II, not all of them have met the target of 5 working days for border crossing procedures (3 days for rapid reaction units). Because of the lack of indicators and specific targets, including target dates, to be achieved for all actions, we cannot give a precise overall assessment of the progress made on Action Plan 2.0, beyond indicating that implementation of actions is ongoing and progress has been variable (see paragraphs 65-77).

45

Recommendation 6 – Make the design of the EU’s military mobility actions more focused When designing future military mobility action plans, the Commission and the EEAS should: (a) systematically exploit the lessons learned from the current action plan, from national and multinational (including NATO) exercises, and from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. These lessons learned should also be disseminated to all relevant stakeholders; (b) focus actions on improving infrastructure as well as clear actions enabling faster cross-border movements and enhancing cyber-security and set indicators, targets and target dates, where possible, to encourage reporting on progress for all actions. Target implementation date: 2026, the last year of the current action plan

This report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Ms Bettina Jakobsen, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 3 December 2024. For the Court of Auditors

Tony Murphy President

46

Annexes Annex I – Timeline of the military mobility developments in the EU, 2017-2024 2024

13 November 2023: European Commission and HR/VP – Joint report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 from November 2022 to October 2023, JOIN(2023) 37 final

2023

10 August 2021: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1328 of 10 August 2021 specifying the infrastructure requirements applicable to certain categories of dual‐use infrastructure actions pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council

2021

28 March 2018: European Commission and HR/VP – Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the Action Plan on Military Mobility, JOIN(2018) 5 final

2018

2022

2019

2017

Source: ECA.

27 May 2024: Council Conclusions on EU Security and defence ”Military Mobility pledge 2024”

21 March 2022: EEAS – A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security 10 November 2022: European Commission and HR/VP – Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council on Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0, JOIN(2022) 48 19 June 2019: Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the EU, Council of the European Union 11373/19

10 November 2017: European Commission and HR/VP – Joint communication to the European Parliament and to the Council “Improving Military Mobility in the European Union, JOIN(2017) 41 final

47

Annex II – Roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders of military mobility in the EU EU MEMBER STATES There is increasing cooperation in the EU on security and defence, and the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) provides significantly more funding for defence than previous MFFs. For example, it introduces funds for dual-use military mobility infrastructure and for the European Defence Fund (EDF). The latter has a budget of €8 billion for 2021-2027, with an additional €1.5 billion under the new Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) instrument with the 2021-2027 MFF mid-term revision. However, these EU funds only represent a small fraction of defence expenditure by EU member states. EU member states consider defence a matter of national sovereignty. According to EDA’s “Defence Data 2022 – Key findings and analysis” document, “in 2022, total defence expenditure of the 27 Member States amounted to €240 billion, continuing the positive trend of eight consecutive years of growth”. Similarly, national budgets of EU member states include funds for military mobility projects and infrastructure for dual-use purposes. No data is available on the amounts involved. EU member states ministries usually have internal audit departments. External audits are carried out by those countries’ supreme audit institutions (SAIs).

SAIs (as well as the ECA) are members of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), which developed the International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). The ISSAIs are the authoritative international standards on publicsector auditing. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a political and military alliance committed to the principle of collective territorial defence. As of 7 March 2024, NATO has 32 member countries from Europe and North America. Out of these 32, 23 are EU member states. Four EU member states are not NATO member countries (Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta). The US and Germany are the top contributors to NATO’s budget. The US is the NATO member country with by far the highest number of activeduty military personnel (approximately 1.3 million). NATO is the key reference/cornerstone for NATO member countries’ ministries of defence in terms of military mobility as well as the key driver for military mobility in Europe (for instance, through its operational plans, military requirements and standards for military mobility, or NATO customs form 302). The NATO 2024-2028 Common Funding Resource Plan includes the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP).

The NSIP funds common investment necessary to enhance and update NATO's assets, including military infrastructure in NATO member countries. The third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation of 10 January 2023 refers to achieving tangible results in military mobility.

48 NATO has an internal audit structure. The International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN) is the independent, external audit body for NATO. IBAN conducts three types of audits: financial audits of NATO bodies and reporting entities, performance audits of NATO, and financial audits of the NATO NSIP. EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004. Its mission was “to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European security and defence policy as it stands now and develops in the future”. According to its 2024 long-term review, the Agency articulates the member states’ defence interests in the EU context, acting as “a true intergovernmental defence nexus at EU level”. EDA organises events on military mobility, such as high-level symposia and has several military mobility initiatives, including: o

The “Project Team Movement and Transport” aimed as an expert-level platform where Member States exchange information and discuss ongoing activities related to military movement and transport with the aim to benefit from them while avoiding duplication. All 27 EU member states participate in the project team, as well as Norway and Switzerland. Partners include the Commission, EEAS/EUMS, NATO, the Movement Coordination Centre Europe, the Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Center and the European Air Transport Command.

o

The “Optimising cross-border movement permission procedures in Europe” programme, established to harmonize and simplify cross border movement procedures, addressing both regulatory and procedural issues.

o

The “Harmonising military requirements related to Customs” programme, which was developed to address customs related activities for the military.

EDA has an internal auditing function. Its external audit is performed by a “College of Auditors” composed of three auditors from three different participating members states. The operational rules of EDA indicate that “The Agency shall operate under the authority and the political supervision of the Council, to which it shall provide regular reports and from which it shall receive regular guidelines.” EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the world’s largest multilateral borrower and lender. In June 2023, the EIB's Board of Directors decided to increase its financing for security and defence up to €8 billion through its Strategic European Security Initiative. It aims to mobilise investment in support of Europe’s dual-use security and defence systems. Military mobility is one of the eligible activities. In May 2024, the EIB updated its definition of dual-use goods and infrastructure eligible for EIB Group financing and agreed to facilitate financing for small and medium-sized enterprises and innovative start-ups in the security and defence industry.

49 The tripartite agreement between the European Commission, the ECA and the EIB covers “both the financing operations under the mandates conferred by the European Union on the Bank and the operations managed by the Bank and guaranteed by the general budget of the European Union”. Military mobility financed by the EIB does not fit into this framework. The EIB has an internal audit department. Its Inspectorate General comprises three independent control and accountability functions: evaluation, investigation, and complaints mechanism. Its Audit Committee is reporting to the Board of Governors 15. The EIB’s external auditor (a private audit firm) reports directly to the Audit Committee and produces an audit opinion on the EIB’s financial statements 16. THE COMMISSION, EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE AND EU AGENCIES For the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0, the key parties involved are: o

DG MOVE, which works at improving long-term infrastructure planning to improve capacity. The three CEF military mobility calls for proposals in 2021, 2022 and 2023 were by DG MOVE.

o

The European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA), to which the Commission has delegated the management of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Transport. CINEA is responsible for the overall management of CEF military mobility calls and all other CEF calls.

o

DG DEFIS, which co-drafted the November 2022 Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0. and manages the military mobility projects selected from the EDF calls, including the Secure Digital Military Mobility System (SDMMS).

o

The Strategy, Coordination and Policy department of the EEAS, which was co-lead with DG MOVE and DG DEFIS for the development of Action Plan 2.0, as well as for preparing the first progress report for that action plan. The European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which is part of the EEAS, provides expertise and strategic advice on military subjects, including military mobility. For the three military mobility calls, the EUMS assessed the two military criteria 17.

o

The Directorate-General Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD) was involved in the development of the customs document for cross-border movements of military goods in the context of military activities (EU customs form 302) and the resulting amendment of the Union Customs Code. It also worked with EDA to prepare guidance on form 302 from a more practical point of view. So far, DG TAXUD’s involvement in Action Plan 2.0 has been limited to offering advisory support for the potential future digitalisation of EU form 302.

15

See the EIB’s Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2022.

16

See the EIB Financial Report 2022.

17

Criterion 1: to what extent does the proposed project contribute to enhanced strategic deployment of military forces in the EU for missions, operations, and routine activities?; criteria 2: to what extent does the project eliminate identified gaps in the member state's infrastructure network, including bottlenecks currently undermining military movements?

50 o

The Directorate-General Communications Networks and Content and Technology (DG CNECT) has conducted two risk assessments for the energy and telecommunication sectors. There is currently no timeline for the next risk evaluation and risk scenarios from a cybersecurity perspective. Action Plan 2.0 provides an incentive to examine the transport sector next.

o

The Commission Secretariat-General’s role is to ensure high-level coordination between Commission directorates and services. It represents the Commission within different fora, such as the Politico-Military Group (PMG) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) at the Council of European Union as well as the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) at the EEAS. It chairs the regular meetings between Commission directorates-general and NATO.

o

Other DGs: DG SANTE 18, DG ENER 19, DG ECHO 20 and DG NEAR 21.

o

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 22.

The Commission, EEAS and EU agencies have internal audit departments (e.g. the Commission’s Internal Audit Service). The ECA is the EU’s external auditor. Our annual reports and special reports serve as the basis for Parliament’s annual discharge exercise. We carry out all types of audits – financial, compliance and performance.

18

For the sixth key action at EU level for pillar III, “Resilience and preparedness”.

19

For the 12th key action at EU level for pillar III.

20

For the 14th Key action at EU level for pillar III.

21

For the fourth key action at EU level for pillar IV, the “Partnership dimension”.

22

For the 13th key action at EU level for pillar III.

51

Annex III – Projects visited on the spot Project objective

EU co-financing (in million euros)

Estonia

A diversified project aimed at enhancing multimodal military mobility in Estonia and improving dual-use transport links to an army base with the construction of a new harbour quay, the reconstruction of a motorway viaduct and the reconstruction of part of a railway line

31.2

Germany

A rail project to improve the infrastructure for 740metre trains on the North Sea-Baltic corridor with the construction of a bundle of railway bridges and sidings

49.6

Lithuania

The development of a road section to the LithuanianPolish border

48.7

Poland

A project to increase the operational capabilities of an airport’s air side for military operations

37.9

Portugal

A project for a dual-use intermodal terminal and rail extensions in a port

7.6

Member state

TOTAL

175.0

52

Annex IV – Progress on key actions of Action Plan 2.0 at EU level – Additional information Traffic lights colour code: green: completed or nearing completion, orange: ongoing, red: progress issues. 23 Key action at EU level

Progress

ECA assessment

Traffic light

PILLAR I – Multimodal corridors and logistical hubs ACTION 1: “By the end of 2022, the EEAS (including EUMS) in coordination with Member States, Commission services and EDA, will update the Military Requirements within and beyond the EU.”

On 23 October 2023, the Council adopted the revised military requirements including Annex II “Multi-Modal Transport Corridors” and an annex on fuel supply chain infrastructure 24.

Completed (with a delay)

Updating military requirements will be a recurring exercise for the EU as NATO reviews its military requirements on a regular basis. ACTION 2: “EDA and Commission services will continue their cooperation in ensuring access to airspace and air navigation services for civil and military aviation…”

We note that “continuing cooperation” cannot be considered a SMART objective as it is not specific, measurable or timebound.

Ongoing 25

23

For further information: see paragraph 77.

24

See Joint report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 from November 2022 to October 2023, JOIN(2023) 37 final (hereinafter: “joint report for November 2022 to October 2023”), paragraph 15.

25

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023, paragraph 20.

53 Key action at EU level

Progress

ACTION 3: “By mid-2023, Commission services together with the EEAS will carry out a study to identify possibilities for short-notice, large-scale movements to improve fuel resilience, long-term infrastructure planning and optimal use of this infrastructure. … Based on input by national authorities, the Commission services and EEAS will analyse possible gaps and suggest actions to address them.”

This action refers to the three-step analysis mentioned in paragraph 36. The gap analysis was being further enriched with input from member states in July 2024.

Ongoing (with a delay) 26

ACTION 4: “By summer 2023, the EEAS, in consultation with Commission services and EDA, will liaise with a willing Member State to organise the first annual event on military mobility…”

The “Expert meeting on Military Mobility – increasing commitments towards a connected Europe” took place in Sweden on 19 and 20 June 2023.

Done 27

ACTION 5: “… the Commission will, within the overall review of priorities in the mid-term review of the MFF, consider strengthening the military mobility budget…”

This was considered. However, no budget for dual-use infrastructure projects was added as a result of the mid-term review of the MFF. A group of member states, including some we visited, had been unsuccessfully lobbying for such an increase in military mobility funding.

Done

26

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023, paragraph 17.

27

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023, paragraph 3.

ECA assessment

Traffic light

54 Key action at EU level

Progress

ECA assessment

According to the November 2023 progress report, on which EDA gave feedback to the Commission, these actions are ongoing 28.

These four actions are primarily addressed to EDA meaning we cannot audit them (see paragraph 20 and Annex II).

Traffic light

PILLAR II – Regulatory support measures ACTION 1: “By 2024, EDA will support participating Member States to fully implement the technical arrangements for cross-border movement permissions procedures for surface and air by monitoring their usage as well as by identifying and resolving bottlenecks and obstacles; identify fields not covered in the signed Technical Arrangements and improve their content; and develop a Technical Arrangement for the maritime domain.” ACTION 2: “By the end of 2024, EDA will assess how to increase synergies between the work done by the PESCO project “Military Mobility” and the PESCO project “Network of LogHubs in Europe and Support to Operations.” ACTION 5: “By 2024, EDA will elaborate a concept for an EUwide logistics IT network to enable the exchange of logistic data amongst various participants. By 2023, EDA will present the findings of a study on mapping of national and commercial logistics IT systems, including the Track & Trace and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software, which will serve as a basis for initiating further actions.” ACTION 6: “By 2024, EDA will define a first package of common standards to promote military use of Additive Manufacturing solutions in an interoperable manner.”

28

In November 2024, EDA informed us that it has carried out action 2, that the final report for action 5 (Concept for an EUwide logistics IT network) is available and has been shared with the participating member states, and that the project management plan for action 6 (Additive manufacturing for logistic support) has been drafted and the first results are available. Note: All member states we visited gave us positive feedback on these two PESCO projects, and particularly on the military mobility project, which involves 25 EU member states plus the US, Canada and Norway. Participating EU member states provide an annual implementation report for the PESCO military mobility project.

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023, paragraphs 21 and 22 for action 1, paragraph 23 for action 2, paragraph 27 for action 5 and paragraph 28 for action 6.

55 Key action at EU level

Progress

ECA assessment

ACTION 3: “The Commission will identify topics under the European Defence Fund in future annual work programmes that will enhance Military Mobility…”

In addition to the SDMMS project selected under the 2021 EDF call, the FASETT project was selected under the 2022 EDF call and the ESOCA was selected under the 2023 EDF call.

Done so far

ACTION 4: “The Commission will monitor the development of the digital system for the secure and quick exchange of information on military mobility and, if needed, will prepare legal amendments to the EU Customs Legislation to ensure that there is a legal framework for the use of the System by the Member States and that the System is aligned with the customs procedures as established in the EU Customs Legislation.”

For further information, see paragraph 69.

Ongoing

Traffic light

56 Key action at EU level

Progress

ECA assessment

Traffic light

PILLAR III – Resilience and preparedness ACTION 1: “EDA in close consultation with Member States, EEAS and Commission services, will follow-up on the CARD focus area Enhanced Military Mobility, to address the gaps and deficits with regard to the resilience as well as the logistical and lift capacity required for the movement of large-scale forces…” ACTION 3: “By 2023, EDA will explore the adaption of civil outsized cargo assets for military purposes, taking into account the activities of the PESCO Project ´Strategic Air Transport for Outsized Cargo (SATOC)´” ACTION 4: “By 2024, EDA will identify possible requirements for specialised rail transport assets and strategic sealift capabilities.”

According to the November 2023 progress report, for which EDA gave feedback to the Commission, these actions are ongoing 29. In November 2024, EDA informed us that it is launching two studies, one for rail and another for inland waterways transport capacities (including infrastructural and regulatory aspects).

These four actions are primarily addressed to EDA, meaning we cannot audit them (see paragraph 20 and Annex II).

ACTION 7: “By 2024, EDA, together with Commission services and EEAS (including EUMS), will assess the benefit of strategic lift capacities for dual use, such as disaster relief.” ACTION 10: “EDA and Commission services will continue their efforts to ensure reliable and effective exchange and sharing of digital data between relevant civil and military aviation stakeholders.”

Need for digital data sharing highlighted in the November 2023 progress report but no information of actual work ongoing 30.

29

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023: paragraph 30 for actions 1 and 3, paragraph 31 for action 4 and paragraph 29 for action 7.

30

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023: paragraphs 32 and 35 for action 10.

57 Key action at EU level

Progress

ACTION 12: “EDA, together with EEAS and Commission services, will build on ongoing initiatives to enhance the climate resilience and energy security of military installations and transport capabilities that are necessary for military mobility, and put forward recommendations to Member States as part of the work on climate and defence….”

According to the November 2023 progress report, for which EDA gave feedback to the Commission, this action is ongoing 31.

ACTION 2: “By 2023, the EEAS will assess the logistical footprint for CSDP missions and operations, notably with regard to certifications and inspections, as well as identify possible gaps in the lift capacity and provide recommendations on collaborative opportunities.”

No information in the November 2023 progress report.

No information obtained on this action when consulting stakeholders.

ACTION 5: “EEAS, EDA and Commission services will explore how to strengthen the coordination of movement capacity, including by seeking synergies with multi-national movement coordination centres.”

According to the November 2023 progress report, this action is ongoing 32.

No further information.

ACTION 6: “By the end of 2024, Commission services will provide an overview per transport mode of all key actors in the civilian domain for emergency and crisis planning and coordination purposes.”

No information in the November 2023 progress report.

No information obtained on this action when consulting stakeholders. However, different stakeholders insisted on the importance of a “whole-ofsociety” approach for military mobility.

31

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023: paragraph 34 for action 12.

32

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023: like for action 7, see paragraph 29 for action 5.

ECA assessment

Traffic light

58 Key action at EU level

Progress

ECA assessment

ACTION 8: “The EEAS, Commission and EDA will exploit multinational exercises to mainstream military mobility activities (deployment, sustainment and redeployment of the forces), including EU live exercises and Parallel and Coordinated Exercises with NATO, as well as through EU participation in NATO exercises, as appropriate.”

No information in the November 2023 progress report.

The importance of military exercises was underlined by all stakeholders. The PESCO military mobility project has been conducting table-top exercises to test cross-border movement permissions (CBMP). The member states we consulted participated in different military exercises in 2024, such as Steadfast Defender 24 with NATO or Quadriga 24. Four of the five dual-use project coordinators we met informed us that the EU-funded infrastructure will be tested in practice for military mobility. There is no evidence of a formalised analysis of lessons learned from military exercises.

ACTION 9: “The EEAS, together with Commission services and the EDA, will organise scenario-based exercises involving Member States’ experts.”

No information in the November 2023 progress report.

The EUMS is the lead for the annual MILEX crisis management exercises. The last ones were MILEX 22, MILEX 23 and MILEX 24.

Traffic light

59 Key action at EU level

Progress

ECA assessment

ACTION 11: “The Commission services, the EEAS and the NIS cooperation group, in coordination with relevant civilian and military bodies and agencies and established networks, will conduct on a regular basis risk evaluation and risk scenarios from a cybersecurity perspective, focusing on priority critical sectors. …”

According to the November 2023 progress report, risk evaluation and risk scenarios have been conducted for the telecommunications and the electricity sectors 33.

At our meeting, the Commission informed us there was not yet any planned date or scope for such a risk evaluation and risk scenario for the transport sector, which is crucial for military mobility. There are many more stakeholders for the transport sector than for the telecommunications and electricity sectors.

ACTION 13: “By the end of 2023, Commission services together with EASA, and in collaboration with the military aviation authorities and industry, will launch a pilot project establishing a mechanism of mutual recognition of parts used by civil and military configurations of aircraft models. …”

No information in the November 2023 progress report, including in paragraph 20 on “Access to airspace and airspace navigation services (SES and SESAR)”.

No further information.

ACTION 14: “Commission services, EDA and EEAS will explore a set of emergency measures that would provide the military with prioritised access to transport infrastructure, capabilities and routes, when necessary, in times of crisis recognised at EU level. …”

The November 2023 progress report does not refer to work on emergency measures on prioritised access to transport infrastructure. It does, however, refer to the December 2022 Directive on the resilience of critical entities (CER) 34. Transport is one of the essential services covered by this directive. Defence is outside the scope of the directive, however.

No additional information on work on emergency measures on prioritised access to transport infrastructure.

33

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023: see paragraph 32 for action 11.

34

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023, paragraph 33.

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Progress

ECA assessment

ACTION 1: “The EEAS together with Commission services and EDA will continue the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on military mobility with a view to sharing information and ensuring coherence of respective work strands.”

The November 2023 progress report 35 refers to the third EU-NATO Joint declaration signed in January 2023. Article 11 states: “We have reached tangible results in … military mobility …”

NATO is the driving force behind military mobility in Europe. The EU military requirements and EU customs form 302, for instance, are largely inspired by their NATO equivalents.

ACTION 2: “The EEAS together with Commission services and EDA will include military mobility where necessary in the security and defence dialogues with relevant partners, notably with Canada, Norway and the US.”

The November 2023 progress report 36 mentions the participation of the US, Canada and Norway in the PESCO military mobility project. In July 2022, the UK applied to join the project. Formal approval was subsequently given at a meeting of EU defence ministers on 15 November 2022. The arrangements for the UK’s participation need to be finalised.

Ongoing.

PILLAR IV – The partnership dimension

35

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023, paragraphs 37-39 for action 1.

36

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023, paragraph 38 for action 2.

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61 Key action at EU level

Progress

ECA assessment

ACTION 3: “The Commission services and the EEAS will explore dual use possibilities of the ongoing work on better connecting Member State’s main transport routes with a particular focus on Ukraine and Moldova.”

The November 2023 progress report 37 refers to the TEN-T Regulation revision process. This revision will extend the TENT corridors, building on the Solidarity Lanes Initiative launched in May 2022 by the Commission to help Ukraine keep its trade routes open following Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian ports.

Additional information: the ministries we visited expressed the view that the TEN-T Regulation revision could have been an opportunity for the EU to include the military requirements in the regulation and, therefore, to be able to use all EU-funded infrastructure as dual-use infrastructure meeting the EU military requirements. They recognised, however, that there are countries for which such an approach would have been very expensive and that this is why the revision did not include military requirements.

ACTION 4: “The EEAS and Commission services will explore possibilities to promote dialogue with regional partners, in particular enlargement countries, on best practices.”

“Explore the possibilities to promote dialogue” is another example of an objective that cannot be considered to be SMART as it is not specific, measurable or time-bound. The November 2023 progress report refers to “Connecting to other partners”.

37

Joint report for November 2022 to October 2023, paragraph 40 for action 3.

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Annex V – Visited member states’ feedback on invitations to act under Action Plan 2.0 – Additional information Traffic lights colour code: green: completed or nearing completion, orange: ongoing, red: progress issues 38. EU member state invitation to act

Visited member states’ feedback

PILLAR I – Multimodal corridors and logistical hubs ACTION 1: “Maintain and develop the network of national points of contact for military mobility.”

Five of the seven member states visited have a formal network of national contact points for military mobility. In one member state, the contact points are instead designated on an ad-hoc basis. Another member state considered there was no need for a contact point because all key stakeholders knew each other and worked together closely.

ACTION 2: “Develop and submit dual-use infrastructure proposals…”

All member states had developed and submitted dual-use infrastructure project proposals. Note: as per paragraph 58 and Figure 10, projects were selected for EU funding in 21 member states.

ACTION 3: “Contribute to the update of the Military Requirements for Military Mobility…”

All member states had contributed to the update of the military requirements for military mobility.

38

For further information: see paragraph 77.

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EU member state invitation to act

Visited member states’ feedback

ACTION 4: “By mid-2023, present to the Commission services and EEAS their national assessments of the physical networks’ ability to meet the infrastructure requirements identified in the Military Requirements, to feed into the aforementioned study.”

The wording of this invitation to act was not clear for all member states. However, all except one confirmed that they had participated in the three-step analysis referred to in paragraph 35.

ACTION 5: “Look for synergies on energy efficiency in their national strategies to prepare the armed forces for climate change before the end of 2023, …”

All member states addressed energy efficiency in national strategies to prepare armed forces for climate change by the end of 2023, as called for in the Strategic Compass.

PILLAR II – Regulatory support measures ACTION 1: “Meet, by the end of 2023, the maximum 5 working days objective for border crossing procedures as part of the military mobility “pledge” agreed by the Council in June 2018 and explore the possibility of reducing the time to 3 working days for rapid reaction units, with a view to a possible update of the ‘pledge’”.

The replies we received about meeting these objectives varied. The majority of the member states visited declared they had met the 5- and 3-days objectives and that the deadlines can even be much shorter than 5/3 working days in a crisis. At the same time, some of the member states visited indicated that further exercises will need to be conducted to confirm the achievement of targets and we did not obtain clear replies from a few others. We also noted that there were diverging interpretations on the scope of the target as some member states consider it only to be valid for the duration of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, whereas others stressed that the reference used by the EU (5 working days) differs from the one used by NATO (72 hours). In the light of the above, we consider that there are progress issues for this action.

ACTION 2: “Participate in and provide the necessary data for relevant studies undertaken at EU level.”

Member states differ in their understanding of “EU level”. Some regard EDA and PESCO as EU-level bodies, while others do not. Therefore, some member states replied that they had provided such information while others told us they had not received any such requests.

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EU member state invitation to act

Visited member states’ feedback

ACTION 3: “Actively support the development of a Technical Arrangement for Cross Border Movement Permissions for the maritime domain.”

All member states actively supported the development of a technical arrangement for cross-border movement permissions for the maritime domain.

PILLAR III – Resilience and preparedness ACTION 1: “Ensure the cyber-resilience of the future digital processes and procedures, building on the EDA’s work and exploring the possibility of developing functional requirements related to security.”

All member states we visited recognised the importance of such threats and are working on cyber-resilience and indicated to us various activities undertaken by them with regard to cyberresilience. However, the action is defined in a way that does not enable us to clearly assess its completion as it lacks clear criteria, a baseline, milestones as well as a specific target. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude on member states’ compliance with this action.

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Abbreviations CEF: Connecting Europe Facility CINEA: European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency DG DEFIS: Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space DG MOVE: Directorate-General Mobility and Transport EDA: European Defence Agency EDF: European Defence Fund EEAS: European External Action Service EIB: European Investment Bank EUMS: European Union Military Staff HR/VP: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / VicePresident of the Commission and President of the Foreign Affairs Council NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation SDMMS: Secure Digital Military Mobility System TEN-T: Trans-European Transport Network

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Glossary Common Security and Defence Policy: Part of EU foreign policy that focuses on security and defence capacity. Form 302: Customs document, developed by NATO and later adopted by the EU for cross-border movements of military goods. Gap analysis: Comparison between current performance and desired or expected performance in order to identify action required to address the gap. Strategic enabler: Capability, capacity, or resource helps achieve a strategic goal.

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Replies of the Commission and the European External Action Service

https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/sr-2025-04

Timeline

https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/sr-2025-04

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Audit team The ECA’s special reports set out the results of its audits of EU policies and programmes, or of management-related topics from specific budgetary areas. The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political and public interest. This performance audit was carried out by Audit Chamber III – External action, security and justice, headed by ECA Member Bettina Jakobsen. The audit was led by ECA Member Marek Opioła, supported by Kinga Wiśniewska-Danek, Head of Private Office and Bernard Witkoś, Private Office Attaché; Michael Bain, Principal Manager; Joël Costantzer, Head of Task; Flavia Di Marco and Laurent Olivier, Auditors. Michael Pyper provided linguistic support. Alexandra-Elena Mazilu-Dina provided graphical support.

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HTML PDF

ISBN 978-92-849-3986-2 ISBN 978-92-849-3985-5

ISSN 1977-5679 ISSN 1977-5679

doi:10.2865/5248734 doi:10.2865/8327529

QJ-01-25-001-EN-N QJ-01-25-001-EN-Q

HOW TO CITE European Court of Auditors, special report 04/2025: “EU military mobility – Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2025.

This audit examined the progress made regarding the EU policy on military mobility, focusing on the EU’s second Action Plan (2.0) of November 2022. The plan was developed under time pressure, amid Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Overall, we conclude that Action Plan 2.0 was not built on sufficiently solid foundations. Progress towards the overall objective – ensuring swift and seamless movement of military personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale – has so far been variable. To strengthen the EU’s impact on military mobility, we recommend improvements in different areas, including governance, funding predictability and the selection of dual-use infrastructure projects under the post-2027 multiannual financial framework. ECA special report pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU.

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