07-03-03 SR-2025-04 ENMilitaymobility05012025

EN

04

2025

Special report

EU military mobility Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route

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Contents Paragraph

Executive summary

I-X

Introduction

01-15

The first action plan on military mobility in 2018

03-04

The Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0

05-06

A budget for dual-use transport infrastructure to support military mobility in the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) 07-10 The European Defence Fund finances defence research and development projects related to military mobility

11-12

Latest developments

13-15

Audit scope and approach

16-20

Observations

21-77

The governance of EU military mobility is complex and fragmented, 21-31 with partial parliamentary oversight Military mobility at EU level involves many actors with partially overlapping responsibilities

22-29

There is no central function or body coordinating military mobility activities in the EU and the European Parliament does not oversee all activities 30-31

The design weaknesses of Action Plan 2.0 impede implementation, 32-41 effective monitoring and reporting Action Plan 2.0 has some design weaknesses

33-39

Reporting on the implementation of Action Plan 2.0 does not provide comprehensive information on progress achieved

40-41

Progress for the four pillars of Action Plan 2.0 has been variable

42-77

Pillar I – the EU provides welcome funding but there is a significant gap and insufficient focus on geopolitical and military aspects

43-64

Progress of actions under the four pillars is mixed

65-77

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Conclusions and recommendations Annexes Annex I – Timeline of the military mobility developments in the EU, 2017-2024 Annex II – Roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders of military mobility in the EU Annex III – Projects visited on the spot Annex IV – Progress on key actions of Action Plan 2.0 at EU level – Additional information Annex V – Visited member states’ feedback on invitations to act under Action Plan 2.0 – Additional information

Abbreviations Glossary Replies of the Commission and the European External Action Service Timeline Audit team

78-92

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Executive summary I The objective of military mobility in the EU is to ensure swift and seamless movement

of military personnel, materiel, and assets within and beyond the EU. Legally, territorial defence is a competence of the 27 EU member states, 23 of which are also members of NATO. The EU is a relatively new stakeholder in this area.

II Following a first EU action plan on military mobility in 2018, the European Commission

and the High Representative/Vice-President jointly published the second action plan on military mobility (Action Plan 2.0) on 10 November 2022 covering the period 2022-2026. Military mobility has become particularly relevant in light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the issues encountered by armed forces in this area in the EU. We therefore consider it timely to carry out an audit on Action Plan 2.0 and the first EU budget for military mobility, which includes a €1.69 billion allocation under the Connecting Europe Facility for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Our audit provides an opportunity both to improve implementation in the current MFF and to prepare for the next programming period.

III We assessed whether Action Plan 2.0 was built on solid foundations and was on track to reach its objectives. Overall, we conclude that Action Plan 2.0 lacked sufficiently solid foundations, and progress towards its objectives has been variable. The Commission consulted all key stakeholders to develop the action plan but did not make a robust estimate of the funding required to reach the objectives set.

IV We found that governance arrangements for military mobility in the EU are complex.

There is no single point of contact for military mobility measures. This makes it difficult for stakeholders, such as ministries of defence, to know who does what in relation to military mobility. The European Parliament has partial oversight of military mobility in the EU.

V The design of Action Plan 2.0 resulted in limitations regarding monitoring and

reporting and a majority of its actions were not sufficiently operational. Action Plan 2.0 was not focused enough and included too many actions. The plan includes EU-level actions for EU stakeholders, as well as non-binding invitations for member states to act.

VI All stakeholders welcomed the military mobility funding introduced in the 2021-2027

MFF as a first step, albeit a modest one. The Commission front-loaded the available amounts into the 2022 and 2023 military mobility calls. This means that no more dedicated funding for dual-use infrastructure will be available until the end of the current

5 MFF. However, the potential applicants for general Connecting Europe Facility transport calls are often the same as those for the military mobility calls.

VII For the three military mobility dual-use infrastructure calls, we found that the

military assessment only accounted for a small part of the overall assessment score in the selection process. Geopolitical aspects were also not sufficiently considered. There is therefore a risk of the EU funded dual-use projects selected not being the most relevant from a military perspective.

VIII After the launch of the third and last call in 2023, however, the Commission, with

contribution from member states, carried out a gap analysis with a view to setting up a plan to address the priority infrastructure gaps and quantify the EU funding needed for the next MFF.

IX The first progress report for the action plan, published in November 2023, did not

systematically include progress information, including on issues encountered, for each action but was more of a list of what had happened in terms of military mobility in the EU during the previous year. Member states were not asked to specifically give feedback via a formalised process on their invitations to act. Overall, we found that only four of the 29 key actions at EU level could be considered completed, while the vast majority remained a work ongoing. There is a lack of indicators and specific targets (with corresponding date), to be achieved for all actions. We therefore cannot give a precise overall assessment of the progress made on Action Plan 2.0, beyond indicating that implementation of actions is ongoing and progress has been variable.

X On the basis of these conclusions, we recommend that the Commission and the European External Action Service: o

improve the governance arrangements for military mobility in the EU;

o

monitor and report on the progress of each action included in Action Plan 2.0;

o

assess the possibility of using Connecting Europe Facility transport calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects under the current MFF (2021-2027);

o

take steps to improve the predictability of possible funding for military mobility under the post-2027 MFF;

o

improve the selection process for dual-use infrastructure projects under the post-2027 MFF;

o

make the design of the EU’s military mobility actions more focused.

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Introduction 01 Military mobility refers to the aim of swiftly and seamlessly moving military

personnel, equipment and assets at short notice and on a large scale – within and beyond the EU 1. It includes harmonising rules across EU member states and exploring the potential for a civilian-military approach to infrastructure development. According to the EU Treaties 2, “the Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence”. The Treaties do not specifically refer to military mobility. Figure 1 includes some practical examples of military mobility issues. The EU’s strategic need for military mobility has become even more urgent in light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which started in February 2022. Annex I shows a timeline of military mobility developments in the EU since 2017.

1

Commission press release: “Military Mobility: EU proposes actions to allow armed forces to move faster and better across borders”.

2

See for example, the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union Article 24.

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Figure 1 – Examples of military mobility issues in the EU

Note: Due to the sensitive nature of this topic, we do not identify the stakeholders concerned. Source: ECA.

02 The European Defence Agency (EDA) (see Annex II), in its Coordinated Annual

Review on Defence (CARD), identified enhanced military mobility as one of six focus areas in which participating member states need to prioritise their development efforts. The 22-long-standing priorities set out in its 2023 revision of the Capability Development Plan include military mobility, as a strategic enabler.

The first action plan on military mobility in 2018

03 President Juncker’s State of the Union address of 13 September 2017 stressed the

imperative of creating a fully-fledged European Defence Union by 2025. Two months later, in November 2017, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) issued a joint communication entitled “Improving military mobility in the European Union”. Building on this communication, the Commission published a first action plan on military mobility in March 2018. Figure 2 below presents its key actions:

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Figure 2 – First action plan on military mobility (2018) – Key actions

Source: ECA.

04 The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP)

and the Commission presented periodic progress reports in June 2019, October 2020 and September 2021. The third report featured a number of developments, including that military requirements for military mobility within and beyond the EU were developed and used to define dual-use requirements – technical standards for projects that can fulfil both civilian and military purposes – for transport infrastructure. The report also flagged that customs formalities for cross-border military movements had been simplified while ensuring synergies with NATO. Finally, it stressed that the transport of dangerous goods in the military domain had been harmonised. The Commission decided not to issue an annual implementation report in autumn 2022 as it planned to publish a new action plan on military mobility in November of that year.

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The Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0

05 The Strategic Compass on Security and Defence, which the European Council

endorsed in March 2022 included the objective for member states to agree on an “ambitious, revised Action Plan by the end of 2022” to take account of “new commitments with the aim to substantially enhance and invest in military mobility”. On 10 November 2022, the European Commission and the HR/VP jointly published the new Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 (Action Plan 2.0).

06 Building on the achievements of the first action plan, Action Plan 2.0 covers the

period 2022-2026. It includes 38 actions – 29 EU-level actions and nine addressed to the member states. These are divided into four main pillars, the last two (III and IV in Figure 3) being new ones:

Figure 3 – Action Plan 2.0’s four main pillars

Note: For further information on “solidarity lanes”, see COM(2022) 217 final. Source: ECA.

A budget for dual-use transport infrastructure to support military mobility in the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF)

07 The EU budget funds military mobility infrastructure under pillar I of Action Plan 2.0. In addition, pillar II covers European Defence Fund projects on military mobility. No EU funding is envisaged for the implementation of pillars III and IV.

10 Action Plan 2.0 stated that the military requirements (see paragraph 04) were around 95 % consistent with NATO’s requirements. Subsequent analysis by the Commission and the EEAS found a 94 % overlap between the EU military mobility network and the TEN-T network (combined average for all modes), meaning that transport infrastructure on the TEN-T network would directly improve military mobility.

08 The 2021-2027 MFF is the first to include a dedicated budget for dual-use transport

infrastructure projects, which amounts to €1.5 billion (€1.69 billion in current prices) and is provided under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Regulation. The CEF is a funding instrument providing €25.81 billion over the 2021-2027 period for strategic investment in EU transport infrastructure. The Commission’s initial proposed budget for dual-use transport infrastructure had amounted to €5.8 billion in 2018 prices (€6.5 billion in current prices) 3. The reasons why the final budget was much lower include the impact of COVID-19 on the 2021-2027 MFF. This major cut was considered by analysts to go against the EU’s crucial need for military mobility 4 and was criticised by the European Parliament 5. To put this amount into perspective, EDA’s “Defence Data 2022” report shows that the EU member states’ total defence expenditure in 2022 alone was €240 billion.

09 Three successive CEF military mobility calls for proposals were launched in

September 2021, May 2022 and May 2023, respectively. Following the first call, the budget for the second call was almost doubled in order to frontload military mobility funding in the context of the war in Ukraine. The remainder of the budget available for the 2021-2027 MFF was allocated to the 2023 call. The outcomes of the three calls are summarised in Figure 4.

3

See Special meeting of the European Council (17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 July 2020) conclusions, point 116, and European Parliament Briefing “Security and defence Heading 5 of the 2021- 2027 MFF” PE 690.545, April 2021.

4

See “Military Mobility: Ambition versus Reality” by Teresa Usewicz, Andrzej Czekaj and Witold Bartoszek, 2022, and “Europe’s military mobility: latest casualty of EU budget battle” by Alexandra Brzozowski, 25 February 2022.

5

European Parliament resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2021 (2021/2183(INI)).

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Figure 4 – CEF military mobility calls for proposals 2021 call

2022 call

2023 call

Selected projects

22

35

38

EU co-financing

€327.6 million

€611.9 million

€771.7 million

Average project duration

48 months

37 months

37 months

Note: Data based on the CINEA dashboard as at the end of August 2024. The planned project end dates range from December 2026 to December 2027 for the three consecutive calls. Source: ECA.

10 The mid-term revision of the 2021-2027 MFF, agreed on 28 February 2024, included

no additional funding for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects. It did, however, include an increase of €1.5 billion for the European Defence Fund 6 (EDF), which finances defence research and development projects. The annex to the Commission’s proposal, published on 20 June 2023, explained that “in the future, it will be challenging to finance any additional initiative under Heading 5, dedicated to Security and Defence, which is the smallest of all MFF headings. … no reserves are available, and the margins are exhausted…”.

The European Defence Fund finances defence research and development projects related to military mobility

11 Action Plan 2.0 refers, under “Regulatory support measures”, to the “Secure Digital

Military Mobility System” (SDMMS) project, selected for funding under the 2021 EDF call. This €9 million project started on 1 December 2022 and is coordinated by an Estonian private research and development company working in the field of information and communication technology. The other project participants come from Bulgaria (two companies), Czechia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland and

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Council press release on the mid-term revision.

12 Romania. The project’s aim is to facilitate the direct and secure exchange of information between governments requesting and approving military movements.

12 Military mobility has continued to be included in the latest versions of the EDF’s

long-term plan, published in March 2023 and March 2024 respectively. Additional EDF military mobility projects may be financed until the end of the MFF.

Latest developments

13 In June 2024, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a revised TEN-T

Regulation, which for the first time also reflects the aim of military mobility in the TEN-T network. With a view to further aligning standards between the TEN-T network and the EU military transport network, on 23 October 2023 the Council adopted revised military requirements. The expanded military requirements notably encompass logistic hubs and fuel supply-chain infrastructure, in light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

14 A joint report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Action Plan 2.0 from November 2022 to October 2023 was issued on 13 November 2023. The next progress report was due to be presented by the HR/VP and the Commission by the end of November 2024. This is the main document published on the action plan’s monitoring.

15 In its conclusions on EU security and defence of 27 May 2024, the Council included a

new “military mobility pledge 2024”. It also invited stakeholders at EU level to coordinate the regular stocktaking of progress made, with a view to the full and comprehensive implementation of the military mobility pledge by 2026.

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Audit scope and approach 16 We decided to carry out an audit of military mobility in the EU, as it is now a crucial

and priority element of the EU’s defence capabilities in light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The present moment is an appropriate one to look at Action Plan 2.0 and the first EU budget for military mobility, as our audit provides the opportunity both to improve implementation under the current MFF and to prepare for the next programming period.

17 The objective of the audit was to assess whether Action Plan 2.0 has been built on

solid foundations and was on track to reach its objectives. This is our second special report on EU actions and spending in the area of defence. The first report on defence research financed by the EU budget included a recommendation to design a long-term strategy for the EDF. In addition, we have issued an opinion concerning the European Defence Industry Programme.

18 To answer the main audit question, we asked the following sub-questions: (1) Is the governance for military mobility actions and spending in the EU clear and are suitable accountability arrangements in place? (2) Is Action Plan 2.0’s design conducive to achieving the overall objective of having a “well-connected military mobility network, with shorter reaction times”? (3) Is Action Plan 2.0 on track to reach its objectives, for each of its four pillars?

19 The audit covers the period from September 2021 until April 2024, and covers the

three military mobility calls under the Connecting Europe Facility 2 Regulation. Our audit work comprised the following: —

We met representatives from: several Commission directorates-general; the EEAS, including the EU Military Staff (EUMS); the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Agency (CINEA); EDA; the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) military mobility project; NATO international staff; a think-tank working on military mobility and an academic with experience in the area.

—

We met representatives of the ministries of defence, transport/infrastructure and finance and the customs administrations in seven member states (Germany, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal). These member states were selected on the basis of several criteria, including geographical coverage, proximity to the EU’s eastern borders and the materiality of projects. Though the member states were not our auditees, we consulted them to receive feedback and

14 corroborative evidence, including through a questionnaire. Our assessment of progress made on member states’ invitations to act is based on feedback obtained from the member states visited. —

We also visited dual-use infrastructure projects funded by the EU through the 2021 or the 2022 military mobility calls in five of these member states (Germany, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal), as well as the coordinator of the SDMMS project in Estonia. There were no EU-funded dual-use infrastructure projects from the 2021 and 2022 calls in Greece or the Netherlands.

—

We carried out a documentary review of 24 dual-use infrastructure projects funded by the EU through the first two military mobility calls in 2021 and 2022.

—

A panel of experts convened to discuss draft conclusions and recommendations.

20 We have no audit rights in respect of EDA or PESCO, which are not financed by the

EU budget, and are therefore outside of the scope of this audit. Due to the sensitivity of this topic, the report does not disclose certain details and references, and presents information on exchanges with member states in aggregate form only.

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Observations The governance of EU military mobility is complex and fragmented, with partial parliamentary oversight

21 Accountability and transparency are indispensable for the democratic, legitimate,

and effective governance of the EU. In this section of the report, we examine whether the governance of military mobility in the EU is sufficiently clear. To this end we assess whether there are clear responsibilities for military mobility including a coordination function at EU level, and what arrangements exist for oversight by the Council and the European Parliament.

Military mobility at EU level involves many actors with partially overlapping responsibilities

22 NATO is an intergovernmental political and military alliance and its membership

includes 23 EU member states. Legally, territorial defence is a competence of the 27 EU member states, 23 of which are also members of NATO. The alliance does not have its own military force; its member countries provide the personnel, equipment and supplies that make up NATO military activities. NATO does finance military projects.

23 The EU finances civilian and dual-use projects. Its funding of dual-use military

mobility infrastructure projects was welcomed by all member state representatives we met, who regarded it as complementary to NATO and inter-governmental military mobility activities. They considered that EU dual-use infrastructure projects helped enhance co-operation between ministries in member states and therefore helped promote a shift towards a “whole-of-government” approach to military mobility. They identified a further shift to a “whole-of-society” approach to military mobility – which would also involve private transportation companies and civilian transport organisations such as port authorities, sea-port terminals or railway operators – as a major objective for the future. These developments underline the growing complexity of military mobility governance, which requires coordination across multiple sectors and stakeholders.

24 Many different bodies financed by the EU budget are involved in the Action Plan 2.0, primarily:

(1) the EEAS, including the EUMS; (2) many different Commission directorates-general, in particular those for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS), Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE), Taxation and

16 Customs Union (DG TAXUD), Communications Networks and Content and Technology (DG CNECT), as well the Commission Secretariat-General and CINEA, an executive agency.

25 EDA is an intergovernmental agency that predates any EU budget spending on

defence, having been established by a joint action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004. Its mission is “to support the Council and the member states in their effort to improve the EU’s defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European security and defence policy as it stands now and develops in the future”.

26 PESCO is a member state-driven cooperation framework. The EEAS, including the

EUMS, and EDA serve jointly as the PESCO secretariat. There are currently 68 ongoing PESCO projects. The project on military mobility brings together 25 EU member states and non-EU countries to coordinate relevant national measures including those agreed by the member states in the “military mobility pledge” of 25 June 2018. The project on logistical hubs involves 16 member states working together to connect their logistical depots and capabilities to reduce response times and optimise the use of capacities.

27 Even before the EU’s first action plan on military mobility in 2018, both EDA and the

PESCO military mobility project were already working on military mobility at an intergovernmental level. The EU is a new stakeholder in this area. NATO, the EU and EDA and the PESCO military mobility project have different memberships (see Figure 5). In the area of regulatory measures, we identified overlaps (with simultaneous reporting lines and similar project scopes, including in respect of cross-border movements) between what the different stakeholders do in relation to military mobility in the EU. These were confirmed by different stakeholders, including member state representatives we consulted.

17

Figure 5 – NATO, EU, EDA and PESCO military mobility project members

Note: Ireland is an observer for the PESCO military mobility project. Source: ECA.

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28 Moreover, the European Investment Bank (EIB) decided in June 2023 to increase its financing for security and defence to €8 billion through its Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI). Military mobility is one of the activities eligible under the initiative. The EIB is not involved in any actions under Action Plan 2.0. For further information on stakeholders, see Annex II.

29 Of the 29 EU-level actions included in Action Plan 2.0 (see paragraph 06), 18 (62 %)

are primarily addressed to EU institutions, in particular the Commission, but also the EEAS including the EUMS (see Annex II), while the other 11 actions (38 %) are primarily addressed to EDA (see Figure 6). Two of the actions addressed to EDA are also being implemented within the PESCO framework.

Figure 6 – Action Plan 2.0 – Addressees of planned actions

Source: ECA.

There is no central function or body coordinating military mobility activities in the EU and the European Parliament does not oversee all activities

30 We found that there is no central function or body in the EU that coordinates

military mobility measures. Representatives from five member states we visited referred to the governance arrangements for military mobility in the EU, indicating that they were complex and that it was difficult to find out who did what in relation to military mobility. Member states were often not aware of the differences in accountability between bodies financed by the EU budget, such as the Commission, the EEAS or EU executive agencies, and intergovernmental entities working on military mobility in the EU. Figure 7 gives an

19 overview of the accountability arrangements for the key military mobility institutional players in the EU. See Annex II for additional information.

Figure 7 – Military mobility institutional players in Europe – Accountability arrangements overview Institutional player

External audit

EU external audit by the ECA

European Parliament oversight

Council oversight

EU member states (financed by the state budget only) PESCO

Not financed by the EU budget

EDA

EIB

Financed by the EU budget

EU member states (beneficiaries of military mobility CEF funding) Commission, EEAS & EU, agencies

Source: ECA.

31 The European Council and the European Parliament have the power to oversee, and

the ECA to audit, bodies financed by the EU budget (the Commission, the EEAS and EU agencies) or guaranteed by the EU general budget 7. The Parliament therefore lacks the power to oversee PESCO projects and EDA, meaning it does not oversee all military mobility activities in the EU. The Council does, however, have oversight of EDA and PESCO.

7

See Annex II for the EIB.

20

The design weaknesses of Action Plan 2.0 impede implementation, effective monitoring and reporting

32 In this section of the report, we examine whether Action Plan 2.0 is sufficiently

robust. We assess whether it was prepared in consultation with the relevant stakeholders and whether it is underpinned by an evidence-based needs analysis. We also examine whether the actions it includes are the most relevant ones, and whether they are accompanied by specific measurable, relevant, and time-bound objectives together with baselines and milestones. Lastly, we assess whether reporting and monitoring arrangements are in place to oversee the implementation of Action Plan 2.0.

Action Plan 2.0 has some design weaknesses

33 Action Plan 2.0 recalls the achievements of the 2018 action plan, but its

development was not preceded by an in-depth ex ante analysis and a needs assessment allowing the evaluation of a commensurate budget. The Commission directorates-general and the EEAS did not have much time to develop Action Plan 2.0 as the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, issued on 24 March 2022, included the commitment: “By the end of 2022, ... agree on an ambitious, revised Action Plan”. Nevertheless, all the member states we visited were consulted on the preparation of Action Plan 2.0. Member states and their various ministries, in particular the ministries of defence, were approached via different channels, such as their permanent representations in the EU or the PESCO military mobility project.

34 Action Plan 2.0 can be divided into two major areas. The first concerns dual-use

infrastructure projects 50 % co-financed by the EU (pillar I). The second concerns administrative and procedural aspects of military mobility (pillars II to IV). The two aspects are complementary. Different member states may consider one aspect more important than the other depending on their national circumstances (e.g. whether they have sound national transport networks).

35 At the time Action Plan 2.0 was published, the Commission had not made a robust

estimate of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable. The EEAS, including the EUMS, and DG MOVE did, however, express the intention to quantify EU funding needs for dual-use infrastructure. Member states, their ministries of defence and ministries of transport were invited to participate in a study, which included a three-step gap analysis to “set up a plan to address the infrastructure gaps, notably by quantifying the necessary EU funding under CEF III by end 2024” for the post-2027 MFF.

36 The results of this gap analysis were due to be presented by March/April 2024.

While the ministries of defence welcomed this gap analysis, some of those we consulted

21 wondered why it was urgent to complete it in the first half of 2024, given that no further dual-use infrastructure calls were planned for the 2021-2027 MFF as no more EU funds were available. The third and final call for EU-funded dual-use infrastructure projects closed 3 months after the study started, in September 2023. The gap analysis is meant to result in the establishment of a project list with cross-border and major national projects, identifying which of these have military value. According to the Commission, the outcome of this gap analysis will feed into the preparation of the post-2027 MFF, for which it will have to present proposals in mid-2025.

37 The wording of the Action Plan was the result of a compromise which, while

ensuring common agreement, may have diluted its overall effectiveness by accommodating the diverse positions of the 27 member states. Our assessment was corroborated by the member state representatives we met. The plan states that EU-level actors “will” undertake the actions addressed to them, but merely “invites” the member states to undertake the actions addressed to them. One reason for this is national sovereignty in matters of defence.

38 Three of the seven member states we visited consider Action Plan 2.0 a political

document communicating that the EU is active in the area of military mobility, rather than an operational document. Some tasks addressed to member states also overlap with tasks on which member states are already working or have already worked 8. Only 13 of the 29 “key actions at EU level” 9 (i.e. less than 45 %) have target dates, in the form of a year or the end of a year. None of them have indicators accompanied by baselines or milestones. This hinders effective monitoring and reporting on progress made.

39 Some of Action Plan 2.0’s administrative and procedural actions are implemented

within EDA working groups or through the PESCO military mobility project. Six of the seven member states we visited confirmed that the strategic objectives of Action Plan 2.0 had been translated into operational objectives at national level which are included, for instance, in their national military mobility plans. The Netherlands’ national military mobility plan is the only one that is publicly available. All seven member states have different forms of working channels at national level to coordinate and discuss progress on military mobility. Four of the seven member states also monitor Action Plan 2.0.’s implementation progress at national level.

8

Such as tasks arising from the 25 June 2018 Council conclusions on security and defence (paragraph 18) or from different EDA working groups.

9

Pillar 1: 3 out of 5, pillar 2: 4 out of 6, pillar 3: 6 out of 14, pillar 4: 0 out of 4.

22

Reporting on the implementation of Action Plan 2.0 does not provide comprehensive information on progress achieved

40 In terms of the monitoring of Action Plan 2.0, only annual progress reports are

planned. Member states have no obligation to specifically report to the EU via a formalised process on the actions they are “invited” to take, and therefore do not do so. On the other hand, EDA reports to the EU institutions on the progress of the actions primarily addressed to it.

41 The first progress report for Action Plan 2.0 was published in November 2023. It is

purely for information purposes, with no further steps envisaged. Because of the way Action Plan 2.0 was set up, the report does not and cannot systematically include information on progress made to date on each individual key action at EU level, quite apart from the fact that it does not include information on the progress of the actions member states were invited to take. The document is therefore more of a list of what has happened in terms of military mobility in the EU in the past year of the reporting period without a clear reference to the actions set out in the action plan. As a result, the report does not establish whether the EU is making progress on several actions, including some under “Resilience and preparedness”.

Progress for the four pillars of Action Plan 2.0 has been variable

42 In this section of the report, we examine the progress made in implementing Action

Plan 2.0. For pillar I, we assess whether the Commission’s allocation of EU funding to dual-use transportation projects was based on sound criteria addressing priority gaps in the most geostrategic locations in the EU. We also assess the progress made in completing actions across all four pillars of Action Plan 2.0. In addition, we summarise the feedback received on the examined member states‘ progress in implementing their invitations to act.

Pillar I – the EU provides welcome funding but there is a significant gap and insufficient focus on geopolitical and military aspects Limited EU budget used up before most urgent priorities determined

43 The stakeholders we interviewed all regarded the 2021-2027 MFF’s budget of

€1.69 billion for military mobility dual-use infrastructure as modest, but they also generally welcomed it as a first step in the right direction. With such an amount, they considered it a given that only small, individual projects on a TEN-T network could be financed, rather than financing even part of a corridor. The average EU funding for the 95 military mobility projects selected was €18 million. One of the admissibility and

23 eligibility conditions for projects was that they should be located on both a TEN-T network and the EU military network (see Table 1).

Table 1 – 2021-2027 CEF2 military mobility main admissibility and eligibility conditions Admissibility and eligibility conditions – Main elements Admissibility conditions (extract) Letters of support by the member state (generally, the ministry of transport/infrastructure) o

Environmental compliance file for works projects and studies plus climateproofing studies for the third call

o

Military network map declaration

Eligibility conditions (extract) o

Project complies with the maximum/minimum duration set out in the call conditions

o

Project is located on the TEN-T network

o

Project is located on the EU military transport network

o

Project meets at least one dual-use requirement and its corresponding value or standard as defined in the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1328

44 Even individual major infrastructure projects often cost more than the €1.69 billion

available for all 27 EU member states planned for the whole seven-year MFF. To further illustrate the limitations of this amount, back in 2016 the EIB noted an annual investment shortfall in the EU amounting to €80 billion to upgrade transport networks to reduce congestion costs and trade bottlenecks 10. The member state ministries of defence we consulted insisted that the military’s needs go beyond infrastructure on the TEN-T networks, for various reasons. These include the need for transportation to and from future military defensive positions and the need to develop local infrastructure to transport the military to the front in the event of a conflict and to evacuate civilians. However, with the level of EU funds available, it was generally understood that there were no EU funds available for such investments.

10

EIB, Restoring EU competitiveness (2016 version), p. VIII.

24

45 To take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Commission front-loaded the available amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls. Six of the seven member states we consulted considered this to be the right approach to take, as EU-funded projects could then potentially be completed earlier. Whereas making this budget quickly available for investments in dual use infrastructure sent an important political signal from the EU, we found that it led to EU funding that was not stable and predictable, as there will be a gap of more than 4 years until the next MFF – and therefore a significant interval before any new calls and funding for dual-use infrastructure. Three of the seven member states we visited noted such “inconsistency” in the EU funding provided. Some member states we consulted also pointed out the fact that the three-step gap analysis (see paragraph 35) would not be used for years and that there would be a loss of experience, in addition to the risk of delaying important investments. Applicants for CEF transport calls and military mobility calls are often the same

46 The military mobility dual-use infrastructure project calls represented an opportunity for beneficiaries for different reasons:

o

airport projects could be co-funded by the EU, something that had become difficult otherwise;

o

no cost-benefit analysis was required (even though beneficiaries made their own internal cost analyses);

o

in the first call, projects that had already started or were initiated before the calls could still receive EU funding; in the second and third calls, projects could start at the earliest on the proposal’s submission date (i.e. after the calls were launched).

47 However, according to all but one of the member states we visited, the

environmental compliance file and/or climate proofing study added for the third call represent a complication – because they take a long time, slowing down projects – and should be simplified. Three of the seven member states we visited questioned whether such files/studies were even appropriate for military mobility, given the urgency of their needs with a war ongoing in Europe.

48 Most of the member states we consulted considered the 50 % EU co-financing rate

fair. The potential applicants for general CEF transport calls are often the same as those for the military mobility calls. Indeed, according to the feedback we received, EU CEF transport projects are also often located on both the core TEN-T network and the military mobility network and meet dual-use requirements, as required for CEF military mobility calls (see Table 1 above). This is the case, for example, for highway projects. Furthermore,

25 particularly in member states eligible for cohesion funding, where other funds are offering co-financing rates of up to 85 %, a rate of 50 % is less attractive. Project maturity was an essential criterion in the selection process

49 We sampled 24 projects selected for EU funding under the 2021 and 2022 military

mobility calls for detailed analysis. We visited five of these projects on the spot in Germany, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal (see Figure 8 for further details on this sample).

Figure 8 – Overview of our sample

Source: ECA.

50 Out of these 24 projects, only one started after the call results had been published

and the grant agreement signed. This means the other 23 projects all started at various stages before the grant agreement signature, and four had even started before the call itself was published.

26

51 For the start of the 2021-2027 period, the CEF transport work programme

11

exceptionally provided the possibility of funding projects that had already started (see paragraph 46). For example, according to the 2021 military mobility call for proposals, published on 16 September 2021, costs for dual-use infrastructure projects were eligible from 1 January 2021. According to the Commission, this derogation was to compensate for the gap between the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 programmes resulting from the delayed adoption of the new CEF Regulation 12. One reason this was possible was that the dual-use infrastructure requirements published on 10 August 2021 (see paragraph 09) were in many instances the same as those specified for other TEN-T projects by the TEN-T Regulation applicable at that time 13. The maturity of the projects was therefore a decisive factor in their selection for EU co-financing. Military assessment and geostrategic dimension not sufficiently taken into account in selection of dual-use infrastructure projects

52 Table 2 shows the key steps of the evaluation process for dual-use infrastructure project applications.

11

See paragraph 08.

12

See also Article 4(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility.

13

Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013.

27

Table 2 – Key steps of dual use infrastructure applications evaluation process Successive key steps

Resulting document

First phase of the evaluation process (led by CINEA) 1.

Evaluation by three independent transport experts.

Independent evaluation report

2.

Consensus evaluation by the three independent experts resulting from a meeting led by CINEA moderators.

Consensus report

Second phase of the evaluation process (led by DG MOVE) 3.

4.

—

E-mail for the 2021 call

EUMS military assessment.

—

EUMS evaluation form for subsequent calls

Internal evaluation panel chaired by DG MOVE with members from DG MOVE, DG ENV, DG REGIO and CINEA to review all eligible proposals under call.

Note: Prior to the internal evaluation panel meeting, DG MOVE made a proposal to take into account EUMS assessments for the “priority and urgency” criterion. The scores for this criterion were updated accordingly, when necessary. The updated scores and the justifications were included in the evaluation summary reports.

5.

Final selection committee meeting chaired by DG MOVE with members from DG MOVE, DG ENV, DG REGIO and CINEA at directors’ level.

Final evaluation summary reports and list of proposals selected for EU funding.

In addition, an external independent observer was engaged to oversee the evaluation process for the 2021 and 2022 calls and produce a final report.

53 Under the calls, projects were selected on the basis of five criteria with equal

weighting (priority and urgency, maturity, quality, impact, catalytic effect). For four of the seven member states we visited, the five project selection criteria were either inadequate or only partially adequate to identify projects of key relevance to improving military mobility in the EU. In particular, the military assessment by the EUMS, which looked at whether the proposed projects would actually enhance strategic deployment or resolve infrastructure gaps and bottlenecks, only counted towards the assessment of one criterion - priority and urgency. On the other hand, project maturity was essential (see

28 paragraph 51). Consequently, according to two member states we visited, some of these dual-use projects will not sufficiently address military aspects.

54 We found that the selection of dual-use infrastructure projects for EU funding lacked

sufficient consideration of geopolitical aspects, as the funding was not targeted at the projects with the highest geostrategic values. Three of the six member states that expressed an opinion on the subject had a similar view. Projects were therefore selected in a piecemeal way, project by project, to improve some isolated parts of a corridor but not necessarily in the most strategic locations. All member states visited considered that the selection process for EU-funded dual-use infrastructure projects should include certain forms of prioritisation.

55 In addition, under the 2021 call, the EUMS assessed two projects as “first priority”

and 16 as “very important”. However, 22 projects were selected under the 2021 call. This means four projects were selected for EU funding even though the EUMS did not consider them “first priority” or “very important”. This may be explained by the fact that by the 2021 call was less oversubscribed.

56 A particularly striking example occurred under the 2023 call, when a project to

construct one of the last parts of one of the most strategic roads in the EU from a military perspective was not selected for EU funding even though the other three parts of the same road had been selected under the 2021 and 2022 calls. The assessment of the evaluation criteria for the different parts of this road was carried out by different experts and was not consistent. One way in which the 2023 call differed from the 2021 and 2022 calls was that it was more oversubscribed, meaning that several projects that passed the evaluation thresholds could not be selected due to the limited budget available. In its reply to letters from the member state in question, the Commission reminded it that “the project could also be eligible for funding under future general CEF Transport calls.” The EU funds attracted increased interest from one call to the next but with differing levels of uptake by member states

57 The number of applications with each CEF dual-use infrastructure call increased over time. This heightened competition meant that the minimum scores needed for selection also increased (see Figure 9). The slow start in 2021 can be explained by various factors such as the novelty of such calls or the time needed by different ministries (such as ministries of defence or transport) in certain member states to start cooperating on such issues. The increasing oversubscription of the calls demonstrates the increased interest among member states and project beneficiaries.

29

Figure 9 – CEF Military mobility calls application details

Budget (million euros)

Projects Proposals submitted

Eligible proposals

Projects selected

Call budget

CEF funding requested

Actual funding

Oversubscription rate

2023 Call

112

107

38

790

3 703.7

771.7

x 4.7

2022 Call

63

53

35

330

1 389.1

611.9

x 4.2

2021 Call

26

26

22

330

417.1

327.6

x 1.3

maximum score minimum score

18

20

17 2023

2022

2021

22 23.5

24

Source: ECA.

58 Figure 10 shows that the 95 projects selected for EU funding were split between

21 different EU member states – all of those included in the figure, plus Bulgaria which is involved in a cross-border project. Such cross-border projects (labelled “EU” in Figure 10) account for only two of the 95 selected for funding: (1) From the 2021 call: a railway project for a cross-border connection between Finland and Sweden. (2) From the 2023 call: the design phase of a new bridge over the Danube to connect Bulgaria and Romania.

30

59 In terms of EU contribution, the top four member states, representing 44 % of the total, are:

(1) Germany (16.5 % of the total EU contribution); (2) Poland (13.0 %); (3) Lithuania (7.4 %); and (4) Latvia (7.1 %). There is a clear concentration of EU-funded projects in the east of the EU, with three of these top four member states bordering Russia, three bordering Belarus and one bordering Ukraine.

31

Figure 10 – EU contribution and number of projects per member state (2021-2023 calls)

44 %

of the total EU funding

Germany

300

282.2

Poland

Lithuania

Latvia

125.9

121.3

6

7

222.7

EU budget (million euros) 4

Number of projects

14

Denmark

Sweden

Belgium

France

Estonia

Czech Republic

100.9

96.3

92.3

81.6

77.9

75.5

3

3

4

4

8

5

Romania

Finland

Italy

Slovakia

74.1

71.5

70.5

69.8

3

9

1

6

Netherlands

44.3 2

Portugal

EU

Hungary

Spain

Croatia

23.5

21.8

18.6

9.7

2

3

4.2 1

5

Source: ECA.

3

Slovenia

27.1 2

32

60 On the other hand, on the southern route towards Ukraine, the EU did not fund any

projects in Greece and made only a modest EU contribution to a Bulgarian consortium participant (see paragraph 58). Greece submitted two project applications for the 2023 call, which received scores above the required thresholds but were not selected due to lack of funding. This is another example illustrating that the weighting given to military criteria and geopolitical aspects in the project selection was insufficient (see paragraphs 53 and 54). The other member states with no EU-funded dual-use infrastructure are Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Malta.

61 In addition, different member states directly bordering one another focused on

different types of projects (rail, air, road, etc.), meaning consistency between member states was lacking. Overall, 70 % of EU funding went to rail and road projects. Figure 11 gives an overview of the member states where CEF military mobility projects were located and how much EU funding they received.

33

Figure 11 – Overview of EU-funded military mobility projects under CEF Total number of projects

Calls 2021 Call 2022 Call 2023 Call

35 Finland Russia

EU funding

38

22

(million euros) 1 5

Sweden

10

Estonia

100

Latvia

Denmark

Belarus

Netherlands Belgium

Lithuania

Russia

EU (EU cross-border projects): Swedish / Finnish border Romanian / Bulgarian border

Poland Germany

Ukraine Slovakia

Czech Republic

Hungary

Romania

Croatia

France

Italy Spain Portugal

Source: ECA.

62 Figure 12 shows an analysis of the non-funded projects for the three calls. For

the 2023 call, the main reason for rejecting applications was lack of funding, whereas for the 2022 call the low scores were the main reason. For the 2021 call, only four applications were rejected for lack of funding.

34

Figure 12 – Project applications not selected for funding, by reason (2021-2023 calls) Total by year

Rejected low funding

Rejected low score

Rejected inadmissible

Rejected ineligible

Reserve

2023 Call

43

23

3

2

3

2022 Call

6

14

5

3

2021 Call

Total by reason

28

4

4

49

41

74

8

5

3

106

grand total

Source: ECA.

63 CINEA, together with DG MOVE and the EUMS, have held information days each

year (2021, 2022 and 2023) for CEF transport military mobility calls in order to help potential applicants 14. We visited five projects from the 2021 call on the spot in five member states (see Annex III). The project coordinators all gave positive feedback on the assistance they had received, mainly from CINEA but also from DG MOVE. However, three of the seven member states also considered the application process is complex, including the electronic grant management system (eGrants), which they described as not very user-friendly.

64 Following project selection, CINEA was responsible for preparing individual grant

agreements with each project beneficiary. Project coordinators in the member states manage the projects and report continuously on their progress. Dedicated CINEA project

14

See, for instance, 2023 CEF Transport Military Mobility Info Day.

35 officers are assigned to projects. At the time of our visits, all or parts of three of these five projects were delayed for various reasons.

Progress of actions under the four pillars is mixed Pillar I – “Multimodal corridors and logistical hubs”: solid progress on key actions at EU level and all invitations for member states to act implemented

65 Of the five key actions at EU level under the first pillar, three have already been

completed (one with a delay) and two are ongoing (one with a delay). This represents solid progress overall for these actions (for further information, see Annex IV). The seven member states we visited gave us feedback on the five invitations to act under the first pillar. The member states visited had generally implemented these actions. For further information, see Annex V. Pillar II – “Regulatory support measures”: some progress on key actions at EU level and mixed progress on invitations for member states to act

66 Among the seven member states we visited, there was consensus on the crucial

importance of military mobility, particularly in the current European security context. They differed, however, in their top priorities depending on their national circumstances: for some the top priority was simplifying administrative procedures while for others it was dual-use infrastructure investments.

67 Based on EDA’s feedback to the Commission, the four actions primarily addressed to EDA are ongoing. One of the two actions addressed to the Commission is completed and the other is ongoing. This represents satisfactory progress overall for these actions. For further information, see Annex IV.

68 The SDMMS project (see paragraph 11) is being implemented in response to key

action 3 at EU level under the pillar II. Its objective is to develop a unified software platform that ensures a secure environment for exchanging information on the movement of military units between countries, and for requesting and approving border crossing permits.

69 The SDMMS project consortium includes 11 organisations from 10 member states.

In addition to the consortium members, 11 member states are currently also participating in the project and are expected to contribute almost 20 % of the total project budget. Six of the seven member states we visited were positive regarding the development of this system, with ministries of defence looking forward to the potential of digitalisation. The one member state that was less interested explained this was because there were

36 currently no plans to digitalise the EU customs form 302, as a change to the Union Customs Code would first be needed. In practice, the member states we visited, which are all NATO members, use NATO form 302, which was introduced in the 1950s and on which EU form 302 is based, including for movements within the EU. The system prototype was expected to be delivered by the end of 2025, but the project is delayed.

70 At the time of our meetings, the signature of the project’s memorandum of

understanding by all participating member states was a major area of concern. Until the memorandum of understanding is signed, funds cannot be released by the EU after prefinancing or be received from participating member states that have not signed.

71 The feedback we received from the member states visited on the three invitations

to act under pillar II is mixed, particularly for action 1 – the most important action in terms of meeting the target of 5 days for border crossing procedures or 3 days in the case of rapid reaction units. Actions 2 and 3 can be considered completed. For further information, see Annex V. Pillar III – “Resilience and preparedness dimension”: mixed progress on key actions at EU level, while invitations for member states to act cannot be clearly assessed

72 Pillar III of Action Plan 2.0 concerns the need “to be resilient, including in the context of cyber, climate change and other hybrid threats that may target critical nodes in the transport system used by the military”. This pillar is the one with the highest number of key actions at EU level, 14 out of 29 (48 %), while including only one invitation for member states to act. We found that Action Plan 2.0 includes far too many actions, particularly under this pillar, and should be more focused. Experts we consulted expressed the same view.

73 Annex IV provides information on the progress of the 14 key actions at EU level

under pillar III. Six out of 14 actions at EU level are primarily addressed to EDA, which we cannot audit. According to the November 2023 Action Plan 2.0 progress report, five of these six actions are ongoing. The progress report did not include any information on the work ongoing for Action 10 on “reliable and effective exchange sharing of digital data between relevant civil and military aviation stakeholders.”. According to information received from EDA, this action is carried out by EDA through the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Deployment programme. A dedicated EDF project is ongoing, addressing air traffic management data exchange, among other aspects. We found no evidence of any formal analysis of lessons learned from military exercises that would confirm the existence of a robust and effective lessons learned capability at EU level. Such a capability is crucial in order to ensure that issues arising from national, and multinational (including NATO) table-top and field exercises are properly recorded and addressed via a formal process, in order to recommend remedial actions.

37

74 In terms of the progress made by the EU institutions on the key actions at EU level

for pillar III, according to the information available and our further collection and analysis of information: o

for four there is no specific information on any progress;

o

four are ongoing.

75 One invitation for member states to act seeks to ensure “the cyber-resilience of the

future digital processes and procedures, building on EDA’s work and exploring the possibility of developing functional requirements related to security”. All member states we visited recognised the importance of such threats and are working on cyber-resilience. However, the action is defined in a way that does not enable us to clearly assess its completion as it lacks clear criteria, a baseline, milestones as well as a specific target. Pillar IV – “The partnership dimension”: some progress for key actions at EU level

76 Pillar IV of Action Plan 2.0 includes four key actions at EU level and no invitations for

member states to act. All seven member states we visited are also NATO members. For them, NATO is the main driver of collective defence in Europe. All member states visited confirmed the relevance of the actions under this pillar, particularly in terms of greater cooperation between the EU and NATO. However, they consider that the EU should not duplicate what NATO already does. They recognise the reality of NATO’s high-level classification of information but consider that it should not prevent the EU and NATO from cooperating further and regard military mobility as a good example of EU/NATO cooperation. All four key actions at EU level under this pillar are ongoing. However, one of the actions is formulated in a way that does not allow us to assess the progress made. For further information, see Annex IV.

77 Our assessment of the progress made on key actions at EU level and member states’ invitations to act is summarised in Table 3 and Table 4. The tables use a “traffic lights” colour, with the following meaning: o

green: completed or nearing completion;

o

orange: ongoing;

o

red: progress issues (e.g. only limited progress made, no information available, or not possible to assess completion).

38

Table 3 – Key actions at EU level – ECA progress assessment summary Total