Bijlage 1_onderzoek woningprijzen

Furthermore, the size of the estimated ASRC-effect, of approximately −9,3%, falls within the range of externality effects that existing house price studies have observed for other sources of (dis)amenity.21 For instance, De Vor and De Groot (2011) find an average decrease of 12.2% in the prices of houses that have sold within 500 to 750 m from industrial sites in the Dutch Randstad region; Pope and Pope (2015) find house price increases between 1% to 3% in response to new Walmart stores; Daams et al. (2016) find 16% higher prices for houses nearby highly attractive nature; and, Schwartz et al. (2006) find that properties in New York sell at 3% lower prices when located within 2000 feet from a city-assisted housing site. From a policy perspective, our paper may broaden the discussion about dispersal policies for asylum seekers which is increasingly relevant for policy makers in many countries and allows for several notions of practical relevance. Indeed, the findings suggest that, on average, the opening of ASRCs may not have a considerable effect on the prices of nearby houses. As house prices serve as a proxy for how residents respond to the designation of ASRCs, this then implies that ASRCs are not necessarily perceived as a source of disamenity.

On the other hand, opening large ASRCs in sparsely populated areas may generate substantial negative externalities, although these estimated effects may apply to a limited number of properties. However, fewer or negligible externalities might be caused by smaller ASRCs in those areas or by ASRCs in cities.22 In the context of spatial dispersion policy, future research could investigate whether such negative externalities can

5. Discussion While the study of how housing markets and patterns in migration relate is a dynamic and productive field of research, this study is amongst the first to present findings on how local residents regard the reception of asylum seekers, as evinced by actual market behavior. Our work here represents a novel empirical integration of the literature on migration of a particular kind, that of asylum seekers, and the literature that aims to better understand housing markets at the micro-level. While a priori the effect of the opening of asylum seeker reception centers (ASRCs) on the prices of nearby houses is ambiguous, our expectation of a negative impact on prices is confirmed by the results. We find that the effect pertains solely to housing in less densely populated areas and for ASRC of high hosting capacity, while estimates for cities are economically or statistically insignificant. This suggests that in low-density areas ASRCs may exert stronger negative externalities than in cities, in the perception of local house buyers. Indeed, in areas of low population density, the reception of newcomers might overcrowd local public services and diversity or the presence of ‘others’ might be more noticeable than in cities (c.f. Brons, 2015 and Dempster and Hargrave, 2017).

Indeed, besides a pre-existing higher presence of migrant inhabitants in cities, and an attitude of inhabitants there that tends to be more positive about migrants, recall Diaz-Ramirez et al. (2018) and Dustmann et al. (2016), in cities the agglomeration of human activity might obscure possible negative amenities. While in less densely populated areas in the medium to long term the inflow of asylum seekers may counteract ageing and depopulation similar to general migration flows, at the local level, within approximately 1 km away from ASRCs, negative effects may be present.20 The reader may note here that our study is restricted to estimation of net-effects in the

21 See, for example, Farber's (1998) review of property value studies on undesirable facilities. 22 According to recent news, see NL Times (2019), COA wants more ASRCs in the West of the Netherlands, which is the country's highly urbanized core, in order to spread out ASRCs more evenly. Our findings suggest this strategy might be efficient from a local-externalities perspective, although of course the public costs and benefits will also be determined by other factors, such as land prices at hosting locations or the possible longer-term effects of the spatial allocation of migration flows.

20 Only asylum seekers who are granted the refugee status are allowed to stay in the Netherlands in the medium to long term.

10

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be effectively compensated through appropriate compensations or through other measures, including the design of more integrated policies of integration. The latter might include the creation of appropriate spaces for interaction between migrants and incumbent communities, which strengthen trust and linkages between people as well as facilitate access to services (OECD, 2018b).

500 or more asylum seekers. In contrast, no evident ASRC-effects have been obtained for housing transactions in urban areas. The findings of this study may inform the design of public policies that optimize the spatial dispersion of ASRCs. Declaration of Competing Interest

6. Conclusions

None.

This study has investigated the outcomes of public policy that allocates the hosting of asylum seekers across the Netherlands, by assessing how the opening of asylum seeker reception centers (ASRCs) impacts on the prices of nearby houses. The response of house prices to the opening of ASRCs is obtained by applying hedonic models in a staggered difference-in-differences context. Our findings indicate that the opening of ASRCs may cause the prices of houses within close range to fall by approximately 9.3%. Importantly, this estimated effect pertains to a limited subset of all observed houses, that is, single-family homes in non-urban locations that are close to ASRCs which can host

Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the Dutch Association of Real Estate Agents (NVM) for providing them with transaction data; Arjenne Plaizier and Maarten Sitvast (COA) for sharing data on ASRCs; and Huub Wilbrink (COA) and Hans Rijnks (Dutch Council for Refugees) for their availability for interviews. Gratitude is also extended to the Editor and to three anonymous reviewers and participants of seminars organized by the University of Groningen, the Gran Sasso Science Institute, and the European Commission's Joint Research Center for their helpful comments.

Supplementary materials Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jhe.2019.101658. Appendix Tables A–E Table A Estimation results in full, main specifications.

Within 0–500 m * Post Within 500–1000 m * Post Within 1000–2000 m * Post Post Within 0–500m Within 500–1,000m Within 1000–2,000m Floor space (log) Number of rooms (log) Garden small Garden medium Garden large Constructed < 1906 Constructed 1906–1930 Constructed 1931–1944 Constructed 1945–1959 Constructed 1960–1970 Constructed 1971–1980 Constructed 1981–1990 Constructed 1991–2000 Central heating Insulation Duplex house End-of-terrace house Semidetached house Detached house Downstairs apartment Upstairs apartment Maisonnette Flat with central access Flat with walkway Up- and downstairs apartment Year-by-ASRC controls Constant Observations Adjusted R2 F Statistic

(A1)

(A2)

0.007 (0.017) 0.004 (0.014) 0.006 (0.013) −0.004 (0.005) 0.045⁎⁎⁎ (0.014) 0.029⁎⁎ (0.011) 0.024⁎⁎⁎ (0.009) 0.781⁎⁎⁎ (0.009) 0.045⁎⁎⁎ (0.004) −0.003 (0.011) 0.058⁎⁎⁎ (0.011) 0.200⁎⁎⁎ (0.012) −0.011 (0.011) −0.099⁎⁎⁎ (0.008) −0.112⁎⁎⁎ (0.008) −0.193⁎⁎⁎ (0.005) −0.268⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) −0.240⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) −0.169⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) −0.065⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) 0.086⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) 0.010⁎⁎⁎ (0.002) 0.107⁎⁎⁎ (0.005) 0.024⁎⁎⁎ (0.002) 0.106⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) 0.197⁎⁎⁎ (0.006) 0.074⁎⁎⁎ (0.012) 0.054⁎⁎⁎ (0.012) −0.088⁎⁎⁎ (0.011) 0.012 (0.012) −0.053⁎⁎⁎ (0.012) 0.169⁎⁎⁎ (0.016) Yes −0.000 (0.000) 346,262 0.723 28,177.240⁎⁎⁎

0.003 (0.031) −0.052⁎⁎⁎ (0.020) −0.001 (0.013) −0.011* (0.006) 0.056⁎⁎ (0.023) 0.029* (0.015) 0.051⁎⁎⁎ (0.009) 0.644⁎⁎⁎ (0.006) 0.057⁎⁎⁎ (0.004) −0.048⁎⁎⁎ (0.016) 0.018 (0.016) 0.180⁎⁎⁎ (0.016) −0.182⁎⁎⁎ (0.007) −0.205⁎⁎⁎ (0.007) −0.158⁎⁎⁎ (0.007) −0.216⁎⁎⁎ (0.005) −0.228⁎⁎⁎ (0.004) −0.219⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) −0.151⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) −0.076⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) 0.077⁎⁎⁎ (0.004) 0.018⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) 0.148⁎⁎⁎ (0.005) 0.042⁎⁎⁎ (0.002) 0.152⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) 0.275⁎⁎⁎ (0.005) – – – – – – Yes −0.000 (0.000) 136,107 0.713 13,001.260⁎⁎⁎

Notes: Dependent variable is the log difference of transaction price for spatially matched pairs of houses. The reference categories are end-of-terrace house; no garden; and construction after 2000. Models A1 and A2 represent models (1) and (2), in that order. Clustered standard errors (ASRC) are in parentheses. *, **, *** Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 11

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Table B Estimation results, models by degree of urbanization and house-type.

Within 0–500 m * Post Within 500–1000 m * Post Within 1000–2000 m * Post Post Within 0–500m Within 500–1,000m Within 1000–2,000m Year-by-ASRC controls Constant Observations Adjusted R2 F Statistic

(A3)Urban, all houses

(A4)Urban, single-family

(A5)Urban, apartments

(A6)Non-urban, all houses

(A7)Non-urban, apartments

0.001 (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) −0.003 (0.016) 0.003 (0.008) 0.048⁎⁎⁎ (0.015) 0.036⁎⁎⁎ (0.013) 0.026⁎⁎ (0.010) Yes 0.000 (0.000) 188,507 0.736 16,413.620⁎⁎⁎

0.021 (0.022) 0.014 (0.012) 0.015 (0.011) 0.008 (0.009) 0.028* (0.016) 0.013 (0.009) 0.019⁎⁎ (0.008) Yes 0.000 (0.000) 98,092 0.695 8584.500⁎⁎⁎

−0.020 (0.025) −0.006 (0.022) −0.016 (0.023) 0.009 (0.010) 0.049⁎⁎ (0.019) 0.052⁎⁎⁎ (0.016) 0.030⁎⁎ (0.015) Yes 0.000 (0.000) 89,790 0.669 7549.770⁎⁎⁎

−0.026 (0.030) −0.043⁎⁎ (0.020) −0.007 (0.011) −0.010* (0.006) 0.043* (0.022) 0.033⁎⁎ (0.015) 0.051⁎⁎⁎ (0.008) Yes −0.000 (0.000) 157,094 0.727 13,076.610⁎⁎⁎

−0.077 (0.056) −0.024 (0.030) −0.024 (0.018) −0.000 (0.016) 0.040 (0.043) 0.027 (0.025) 0.029⁎⁎ (0.014) Yes −0.000 (0.000) 19,970 0.669 1679.479⁎⁎⁎

Notes: Dependent variable is the log difference of transaction price for spatially matched pairs of houses. Clustered standard errors (ASRC) are in parentheses. *, **, *** Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table C Estimation results, models by ASRC capacity (C), FUA core sample.

Within 0–500 m * Post Within 500–1000 m * Post Within 1000–2000 m * Post Post Within 0–500m Within 500–1,000m Within 1000–2,000m Constant Observations Adjusted R2 F Statistic

(A8)C > 50

(A9)C > 250

(A10)C > 500

(A11)C < 50

(A12)C < 250

(A13)C <500

−0.025 (0.019) −0.006 (0.017) −0.007 (0.012) 0.012 (0.008) −0.025 (0.019) −0.006 (0.017) −0.007 (0.012) 0.000 (0.000) 71,119 0.708 7169.741***

−0.024 (0.021) −0.002 (0.019) −0.003 (0.013) 0.006 (0.009) −0.024 (0.021) −0.002 (0.019) −0.003 (0.013) 0.000 (0.000) 59,867 0.697 5728.200***

−0.020 (0.051) −0.001 (0.037) 0.029 (0.041) 0.023 (0.016) −0.020 (0.051) −0.001 (0.037) 0.029 (0.041) −0.000 (0.000) 11,440 0.658 916.547***

0.043 (0.030) 0.029 (0.025) −0.000 (0.013) −0.009 (0.014) 0.043 (0.030) 0.029 (0.025) −0.000 (0.013) 0.000 (0.000) 18,671 0.666 1555.337***

0.019 (0.031) −0.012 (0.032) −0.029 (0.029) 0.008 (0.016) 0.019 (0.031) −0.012 (0.032) −0.029 (0.029) 0.000 (0.000) 26,412 0.664 2175.650***

−0.017 (0.026) −0.007 (0.023) −0.017 (0.024) 0.007 (0.011) −0.017 (0.026) −0.007 (0.023) −0.017 (0.024) 0.000 (0.000) 76,815 0.677 6716.099***

Notes: Dependent variable is the log difference of transaction price for spatially matched pairs of houses. Clustered standard errors (ASRC) are in parentheses. *, **, *** Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table D Estimation results, models by ASRC capacity (C), FUA core sample and 250 m intervals.

Within 0–250 m * Post Within 250–500 m * Post Within 500–750 m * Post Within 750–1000 m * Post Within 1000–2000 m * Post Post Within 0–250m Within 250–500m Within 500–750m Within 750–1,000m Within 1000–2,000m Constant Observations Adjusted R2 F Statistic

(A14) C > 50

(A15)C > 250

(A16)C > 500

(A17)C < 50

(A18)C < 250

(A19)C <500

−0.030** (0.026) −0.023 (0.021) −0.006 (0.020) −0.006 (0.017) −0.007 (0.012) 0.012 (0.008) −0.030⁎⁎ (0.026) −0.023 (0.021) −0.006 (0.020) −0.006 (0.017) −0.007 (0.012) 0.000 (0.000) 71,119 0.708 6146.615***

−0.032 (0.027) −0.021 (0.023) 0.002 (0.022) −0.006 (0.020) −0.003 (0.013) 0.007 (0.009) −0.032 (0.027) −0.021 (0.023) 0.002 (0.022) −0.006 (0.020) −0.003 (0.013) 0.000 (0.000) 59,867 0.697 4911.928***

−0.007 (0.059) 0.011 (0.064) 0.006 (0.046) −0.006 (0.039) 0.029 (0.041) 0.022 (0.016) −0.007 (0.059) 0.011 (0.064) 0.006 (0.046) −0.006 (0.039) 0.029 (0.041) −0.000 (0.000) 11,440 0.658 785.940***

0.051 (0.067) 0.039 (0.031) 0.036 (0.031) 0.022 (0.028) −0.000 (0.014) −0.009 (0.014) 0.051 (0.067) 0.039 (0.031) 0.036 (0.031) 0.022 (0.028) −0.000 (0.014) 0.000 (0.000) 18,671 0.667 1333.738***

0.040 (0.051) 0.011 (0.034) −0.009 (0.031) −0.014 (0.036) −0.029 (0.029) 0.008 (0.016) 0.040 (0.051) 0.011 (0.034) −0.009 (0.031) −0.014 (0.036) −0.029 (0.029) 0.000 (0.000) 26,412 0.664 1865.087***

−0.020 (0.035) −0.017 (0.026) −0.005 (0.026) −0.008 (0.024) −0.017 (0.024) 0.007 (0.011) −0.020 (0.035) −0.017 (0.026) −0.005 (0.026) −0.008 (0.024) −0.017 (0.024) 0.000 (0.000) 76,815 0.677 5756.434***

Notes: Dependent variable is the log difference of transaction price for spatially matched pairs of houses. Clustered standard errors (ASRC) are in parentheses. *, **, *** Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

12

13

−0.154 (0.108) −0.065 (0.101) −0.027 (0.047) 0.032 (0.031) 0.571⁎⁎⁎ (0.068) 0.202⁎⁎ (0.080) −0.012 (0.037) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.005 19.617⁎⁎⁎

−0.151 (0.159) 0.115 (0.112) −0.017 (0.040) 0.006 (0.022) 0.135 (0.121) 0.095 (0.062) 0.137⁎⁎⁎ (0.032) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.003 11.425⁎⁎⁎

(A23)Garden medium

0.025 (0.116) −0.069 (0.069) −0.012 (0.037) 0.020 (0.026) 0.063 (0.058) 0.103⁎⁎ (0.051) 0.041 (0.029) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.000 2.597⁎⁎

(A31)Constructed 1981–1990

0.038 (0.086) −0.026 (0.062) 0.048* (0.028) 0.012 (0.012) 0.056 (0.070) 0.092⁎⁎ (0.037) 0.011 (0.021) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.001 4.889⁎⁎⁎

(A22)Garden small

−0.039 (0.049) 0.102 (0.064) 0.010 (0.037) 0.004 (0.024) −0.068⁎⁎ (0.029) −0.013 (0.040) −0.005 (0.025) 0.000* (0.000) 25,361 0.000 1.683

(A32)Constructed 1991–2000

0.114 (0.158) −0.078 (0.082) −0.034 (0.042) −0.016 (0.021) −0.192* (0.107) −0.200⁎⁎⁎ (0.048) −0.152⁎⁎⁎ (0.029) 0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.006 23.905⁎⁎⁎

(A24)Garden large

−0.065 (0.044) −0.009 (0.042) 0.057⁎⁎⁎ (0.018) −0.012 (0.017) 0.102⁎⁎⁎ (0.039) 0.041 (0.032) 0.004 (0.014) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.001 5.917⁎⁎⁎

(A33)Central heating

−0.012 (0.024) −0.019 (0.021) −0.015 (0.012) −0.013 (0.010) −0.021 (0.016) −0.009 (0.017) −0.017* (0.010) 0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.001 3.973⁎⁎⁎

(A25)Constructed < 1906

−0.060 (0.069) −0.047 (0.054) 0.025 (0.028) −0.013 (0.026) 0.121* (0.064) 0.053 (0.041) 0.011 (0.019) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.000 1.784*

(A34) Insulation

−0.028 (0.041) 0.008 (0.031) 0.021 (0.015) 0.002 (0.009) −0.059⁎⁎ (0.029) −0.040* (0.023) −0.034⁎⁎⁎ (0.012) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.001 3.462⁎⁎⁎

(A26)Constructed 1906–1930

−0.071 (0.099) 0.005 (0.043) −0.003 (0.016) −0.012 (0.010) 0.182⁎⁎ (0.091) 0.023 (0.029) −0.007 (0.013) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.001 6.379⁎⁎⁎

(A35)Duplex house

0.021 (0.041) 0.065 (0.060) −0.019 (0.016) 0.008 (0.007) −0.045* (0.024) 0.030 (0.033) 0.018* (0.010) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.001 4.798⁎⁎⁎

−0.083 (0.099) −0.016 (0.070) 0.004 (0.027) −0.000 (0.016) 0.152⁎⁎ (0.071) 0.135⁎⁎⁎ (0.052) 0.063⁎⁎⁎ (0.021) −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.002 9.205⁎⁎⁎

(A36)End-ofterrace house

(A27)Constructed 1931–1944

−0.157 (0.141) 0.016 (0.074) 0.019 (0.037) −0.042 (0.039) −0.117 (0.088) −0.178⁎⁎⁎ (0.052) −0.049* (0.026) 0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.002 6.700⁎⁎⁎

(A37)Semidetached house

0.032 (0.058) −0.065 (0.043) −0.016 (0.033) 0.011 (0.013) −0.064⁎⁎ (0.026) −0.021 (0.028) 0.016 (0.022) 0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.000 1.731*

(A28)Constructed 1945–1959

0.182 (0.140) −0.056 (0.086) −0.047 (0.037) −0.012 (0.020) −0.196⁎⁎ (0.086) −0.125⁎⁎ (0.060) −0.108⁎⁎⁎ (0.027) 0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.004 15.685⁎⁎⁎

(A38)Detached house

0.189⁎⁎⁎ (0.065) 0.065 (0.065) 0.009 (0.032) −0.044* (0.024) −0.276⁎⁎⁎ (0.036) −0.141⁎⁎⁎ (0.023) −0.019 (0.024) 0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.001 4.938⁎⁎⁎

(A29)Constructed 1960–1970

Notes: Dependent variable is the log difference of transaction price for spatially matched pairs of houses. Clustered standard errors (ASRC) are in parentheses. *, **, *** Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Observations Adjusted R2 F Statistic

Constant

Within 1000–2,000m

Within 500–1,000m

Within 0–500m

Post

Within 1000–2000 m * Post

0.071 −0.063 0.058 −0.05 0.004 −0.023 −0.014 −0.014 0.03 −0.049 −0.05 −0.033 −0.006 −0.017 −0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.000 1.555

(A21) Number of rooms (log)

(A30)Constructed 1971–1980

−0.078 (0.081) 0.021 (0.047) 0.011 (0.024) −0.018 (0.016) 0.128⁎⁎ (0.063) −0.057 (0.037) −0.039⁎⁎ (0.018) 0.000 (0.000) 25,361 0.001 3.724⁎⁎⁎

Within 500–1000 m * Post

Within 0–500 m * Post

Observations Adjusted R2 F Statistic

Constant

Within 1000–2,000m

Within 500–1,000m

Within 0–500m

Within 500–1000 m * Post Within 1000–2000 m * Post Post

Within 0–500 m * Post

(A20)Floor space (log)

Table E Housing composition effects.

M.N. Daams, et al.

Journal of Housing Economics 46 (2019) 101658

Journal of Housing Economics 46 (2019) 101658

M.N. Daams, et al.

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